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WHEN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION IS

CRIMINAL
L. SONG RICHARDSON*
Medical researchers engaged in human experimentation commit
criminal acts seemingly without consequence. Whereas other actors who
violate bodily integrity and autonomy are routinely penalized with
convictions for assault, fraud, and homicide, researchers escape criminal
punishment. This Article begins to scrutinize this undercriminalization
phenomenon and provides a framework for understandingwhy researchers
are not prosecuted for their crimes. It argues that their exalted social
status, combined with the perceived social benefit of their research,
immunizes them from use of the criminal sanction. Whether these constitute
sufficient grounds to give researchers a pass from punishment is a
significant question because the state's failure to act creates expressive
harms. It displays attitudes towards victims and perpetrators that
negatively affect the values of autonomy and dignity in medical research.
Moreover, alternativesanctions not only lack the same expressive impact,
but may also inadequately police criminal harm. This Article concludes
that this implicit immunity is harmful to society and inconsistent with
criminal law policy.
I. INTRODUCTION

An unacknowledged problem exists in the realm of human subject
experimentation: criminal acts are being committed seemingly without
consequence.
The individuals escaping punishment are no ordinary
individuals; rather, they are medical researchers whose exalted social status
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combined with the social benefits of their research appear to immunize
them from punishment. Consider the following examples:'
Pregnant women become unwitting guinea pigs in an experiment
testing a medication to prevent miscarriages. As a result, their daughters
and sons are at higher risk for cancer. The researchers are never
prosecuted.
A patient becomes an unwitting participant in an experiment to test the
safety and effectiveness of an ocular implant. Before implanting the device,
the researcher tells him that it is "quite safe" and a "tried and true method"
of vision correction, rather than the truth-that the FDA has not approved
The
the device. The victim suffers permanent damage to his eye.
researcher is never prosecuted.
A healthy twenty-four-year-old woman participates in an asthma
study. Doctors ask her to inhale a drug without telling her that this is an
experimental use of the drug, previous inhalations resulted in death, and the
FDA has not approved the procedure. She dies. The researchers are never
prosecuted.
This Article addresses the significant, yet largely unexplored, question
of why medical researchers escape criminal punishment. Whereas other
1 Other examples of research misconduct also exist. See, e.g., United States v. Stanley,
438 U.S. 669 (1987) (injecting serviceman secretly with chemicals); Barrett v. United States,
689 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1982) (unwitting participant in chemical warfare experiment);
Heinrich v. Sweet, 49 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D. Mass. 1999) (unwitting subjects in radiation
experiments); White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380 (E.D. Wash. 1998) (same); Stadt v. Univ.
of Rochester, 921 F. Supp. 1023 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (same); In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig.,
874 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (same); Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479
(Cal. 1990) (surreptitious harvesting of tissue); Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d
807 (Md. 2001) (testing lead abatement strategies on indigent children without adequately
informing parents of risks); Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 452 N.Y.S.2d 875 (App.
Div. 1982) (enrolling premature infants in experiment without parental knowledge or
consent); Friter v. IOLAB Corp., 607 A.2d 1111 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (implanting
experimental device into patient's eye without consent); Complaint, Robertson ex rel.
Robertson v. McGee, 2002 WL 535045 (N.D. Okla. 2002) (No. OCV006OH(M)), 2001 WL
34783383 (deceiving patients during cancer vaccine study); John Solomon, Government
Tested AIDS Drugs on FosterKids, MSNBC.COM, May 4, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/7736157/ (using children in foster care in seven states as guinea pigs to test HIV drugs
without permission).
2 Mink v. Univ. of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. 111.1978).
3 Kus v. Sherman Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 1214, 1216 (I11.App. Ct. 1995).
4 See Letter from the Office of Human Research Prot. (OHRP) to Dr. Edward D. Miller,
Johns Hopkins Univ. Sch. of Med. (July 19, 2001), available at http://www.sskrplaw.com/
bioethics/letter.html; Warning Letter from Joanne L. Rhoads, Ctr. For Drug Evaluation &
Research, FDA, to Dr. Alkis Togias, Johns Hopkins Asthma & Allergy Ctr. (Mar. 31, 2003),
availableat http://www.sskrplaw.com/bioethics/wamingletter.pdf.
5 In recent years, a number of cases have exposed misconduct by researchers in human
subject experiments. See supra note 1. This has caused many commentators to question
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actors who violate bodily integrity and autonomy are routinely punished
with convictions for assault, fraud, and homicide, researchers walk away
from similar crimes unsanctioned.6 This Article is meant to begin a
conversation that considers why criminal sanctions are not utilized in the
context of human subject research and scrutinizes whether criminal
punishment is an important, but overlooked, mechanism for protecting the
dignitary interests of human subjects. Given the rise in human subject
experimentation as a result of biotechnology research, this is a critical and
timely question.
This Article examines two forms of intentional misconduct. Each, like
the illustrations above, involves a researcher's purposeful and deliberate
failure to obtain consent, thereby violating an individual's interest in selfdetermination and autonomy. The first type of misconduct is that of
researchers who conduct experiments on individuals without their
knowledge. The second is that of researchers who deliberately fail to
disclose to individuals the known and obvious risks of participation in an
experiment. This occurs, for example, when a researcher intentionally fails
to utilize, or significantly alters, an approved informed consent document.
The misconduct involves acts that the criminal law typically punishes:
intentional, deceptive, and non-consensual contact with the person of
another. 7 These acts are customarily prosecuted because they violate one of

existing policing mechanisms. See Alan Meisel, A "Dignitary Tort" as a Bridge Between
the Idea of Informed Consent and the Law of Informed Consent, 16 LAW MED. & HEALTH
CARE 210, 212 (1988); E. Haavi Morreim, Litigation in Clinical Research: Malpractice
Doctrines Versus Research Realities, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 474 (2004) [hereinafter
Morreim, Litigation in ClinicalResearch]; E. Haavi Morreim, The Clinical Investigator as
Fiduciary: Discarding a Misguided Idea, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 586 (2005) [hereinafter
Morreim, The ClinicalInvestigatoras Fiduciary];Grant H. Morris, Dissing Disclosure:Just
What the Doctor Ordered, 44 ARIZ. L. REv. 313 (2002); Leonard L. Riskin, Informed
Consent: Looking for the Action, 1975 LAW FORUM 580, 596; Marjorie Maguire Shultz,
From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219
(1985). However, none comprehensively explore the role that the criminal law can play in
addressing dignitary and actual harms to individuals in research. But see LORI ANDREWS &
DOROTHY NELKIN, BODY BAZAAR: THE MARKET FOR HUMAN TISSUE IN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY

AGE (1999); James T. O'Reilly, Elders, Surgeons, Regulators, Jurors: Are Medical
Experimentation'sMistakes Too Easily Buried?, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 317, 368 (2000) ("If
systemic safety problems expose elderly patients to harm, criminal prosecution is a proper
response.").
6 Importantly, new criminal legislation is not necessary to punish the conduct discussed
in this Article. The acts constitute criminal conduct under existing statutes. See infra note
196.
7 These crimes include the offenses of fraud, assault, battery, rape, and murder. Fraud
has been described as "the very essence of wrong; conduct that has always been and always
will be wrong, according to the common judgment of mankind; conduct that cannot be
dressed up or manipulated or associated so as to invest it with any element of right." Morris,
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our most cherished entitlements-freedom from intentional and nonconsensual contacts with our person. 8
There is no question that informed consent is lacking in these cases. 9 I
focus upon these "easy" cases of non-disclosure in order to center full
attention on the question I seek to consider: why culpable acts in human
experimentation, which eliminate an individual's right to make informed
choices about what will be done to her body, are not punished. While other
forms of misconduct in human subject research exist, ° and will be the
subject of future articles, the fact that these straightforward cases of
misconduct do not result in criminal punishment demonstrates the need to
explore the initial question of why the criminal sanction is overlooked.
This Article provides the first framework for understanding why
research misconduct in the form of deceit and violations of bodily integrity
The framework has two
currently escapes criminal punishment.
components, which I label "idealization bias" and "social benefit bias.""
Idealization bias refers to the difficulty individuals may have in viewing
researchers, who are often doctors, 1 as criminals deserving of punishment.
Social benefit bias refers to the hypothesis that research misconduct is often
ignored or forgiven because of the perceived societal value of the research.

supra note 5, at 322-23 (citing Knox v. Phoenix Leasing Inc., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 141, 147 (Ct.
App. 1994)).
8 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994) ("The protections of substantive due
process have for the most part been accorded to ... the right to bodily integrity." (citing
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847-49 (1992))); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966) ("The integrity of the individual person is a cherished
value of our society.").
9 I do not discuss cases that involve material misrepresentations made when seeking
approval to conduct an experiment using human subjects. I also do not consider problems
attendant to informed consent, such as whether individuals actually understand the document
they sign. See, e.g., Diaz v. Hillsborough County Hosp. Auth., 165 F.R.D. 689, 690 693-94
(M.D. Fla. 1996) (involving pregnant women's suit against researchers, in part because the
women did not understand the informed consent document they signed). The desirability of
utilizing the criminal sanction in these more difficult cases will be discussed in future
articles.
10 For example, human subject researchers often violate the regulations that are meant to
protect human subjects. See infra note 211.
1 This Article does not contend that these biases represent the only explanations for the
absence of criminal punishment. However, they are sufficiently credible to warrant
attention.
12 Morreim, The Clinical Investigator as Fiduciary, supra note 5, at 587 ("[M]any
volunteers are invited into research by their own physicians .... [I]nvestigators [in Phase I
drug trials] usually are physicians, but their relationship with volunteers is completely
independent of the treatment setting." (citation omitted)); O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 321 ("In
the face of health care cost reductions elsewhere in their budgets, more physicians and
physician practice groups are now practicing some clinical research to boost profits.").
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This Article posits that idealization and social benefit bias may affect
decision-making in ways that can result in researchers being immunized
from criminal punishment. This implicit immunity is harmful because the
state's failure to punish researchers creates expressive harms by displaying
attitudes towards victims and perpetrators that negatively affect the values
of autonomy and dignity in medical research. While sanctions outside the
criminal context do exist, these alternatives not only lack the same
expressive impact, but also may inadequately police criminal harm.
This Article unfolds in five parts. Part II discusses idealization and
social benefit bias. Part III scrutinizes the expressive role of criminal
Part IV
punishment and the shortcomings of alternative sanctions.
discusses the utility of imposing punishment. Part V addresses arguments
against use of the criminal sanction and examines considerations that can
guide policy. The Conclusion argues that criminal punishment can restore
the protection of dignity and autonomy in human subject research.
II. THE Two BIASES
This Part explores whether cognitive biases can explain why culpable
medical researchers escape criminal punishment. It draws from the lessons
of social cognition research, which contribute to our understanding of how
individuals process information and draw conclusions. 13 The research
demonstrates that people regularly employ "schemas" to quickly categorize
and assimilate information.14 A schema can be "conceptualized as a mental
structure which contains general expectations and knowledge of the
world." 15 It "represents knowledge about a concept..., including its
17
attributes .... ,, 16 Stereotypes are the best-known example of a schema.
13For a comprehensive review of this literature, see Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson,
CategoricallyBiased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77
S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1125 (2004); see also Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 1489 (2005) (utilizing social cognition research in the study of implicit racial bias).
The approach is different from behavioral law and economics although similarities exist.
See id. at 1494 n.21 (differentiating between his "behavioral realist" approach and "the
cognitive psychological groundings of... behavioral law and economics"). For further
reading on behavioral law and economics, and related literature, see BEHAVIORAL LAW &
ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64
U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997); see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological
Casefor Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1165 (2003) (describing cognitive psychological
concepts affecting decision-making).
14See generally Chen & Hanson, supra note 13 (summarizing research).
15Id. at 1133 (citation omitted). The term has been interpreted in different ways. Id. at
1131; Kang, supra note 13, at 1498 n.39.
16Kang, supra note 13, at 1498 (citation omitted).
17Chen & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1126-27. The concept of a schema is closely
related to the concept of heuristics-rules of thumb or mental shortcuts-that can cause
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Essentially, schemas provide a mechanism for people to make quick
predictions, decisions, or judgments about the overwhelming amount of
information they encounter. 8
Despite the necessity of employing schemas, they create the risk of
biased decision-making because they "guide what we attend to, what we
perceive, what we remember and what we infer."1 9 The two subparts that
follow delineate two possible biases that may result from the schema we
apply to researchers and to the work that they perform. These biases create
the risk of faulty decision-making in the human subject research context
and, thus, may explain the failure to utilize the criminal sanction to punish
culpable medical researchers. The purpose of identifying these potential
biases is to call attention to the possibility of their existence and encourage
further empirical inquiry. Idealization bias is explored in Subpart A;
Subpart B discusses social benefit bias. The words doctor and researcher
are used interchangeably in this Part because the researchers engaged in
human subject research are more often than not medical doctors.20

predictable failures to accurately assess risk or result in judgment errors, as is discussed in
the behavioral law and economics literature. Id. at 1197 (stating that inferential shortcuts
include schemas or heuristics); see, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H.
Thaler, A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS,
supra note 13, at 14 (discussing heuristics).
18 Chen & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1132, 1145 ("Before individuals can draw
inferences (that is, before they can apply a chosen schema to the concepts before them), they
generally need to categorize or label ....
19Id. at 1133 (citation omitted).
20 See supra note 12; see also Frances H. Miller, Trusting Doctors: Tricky Business
When It Comes to ClinicalResearch, 81 B.U. L. REV. 423,424-25 (2001) ("[T]he boundaries
separating medical research from clinical practice are becoming increasingly hard to
trace ....[S]ome drug and device manufacturers now compensate primary care physicians
for enrolling their patients in clinical studies." (citations omitted)). It is important to note
that there are important differences between the doctor-patient relationship and the
researcher-subject relationship. Some commentators argue that it is inaccurate to claim that
a fiduciary relationship exists between researchers and their subjects. See, e.g., E. Haavi
Morreim, Medical Research Litigation and Malpractice Tort Doctrines: Courts on a
Learning Curve, 4 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1 (2003); Morreim, The Clinical Investigator
as Fiduciary,supra note 5; Richard S. Saver, Medical Research and Intangible Harm, 74 U.
CIN. L. REV. 941, 968 (2006) ("Whether a similar fiduciary relationship exists between
investigator and research subject remains subject to vigorous debate."). Although courts
have recognized that special duties exist between researcher and subject, the scope of these
pronouncements remains unclear. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d
479, 485 (Cal. 1990); Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 818 (Md. 2001).
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A. IDEALIZATION BIAS
21
"[D]octors are revered as nearly godlike ....

Role schemas, as the name suggests, help people decide what conduct
to expect from those in certain roles.22 Generally, people do not expect
criminal behavior from a doctor, despite substantial documentation of the
commercialization of science and medicine 23 and the incentives this creates
for misconduct.24 Instead, doctors are often placed on a pedestal.25 They
21

PriceGrabber.com,

How

Doctors

Think,

http://www.pricegrabber.com/search-

books2.php/book id= 15061581/search=How%20Doctors%20Think/st=product/sv-title (last
visited Feb. 2, 2009) (providing synopsis of JEROME E. GROOPMAN, How DOCTORS THINK
(Houghton Mifflin 2007)).
22 Chen & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1137 (citation omitted) (stating that role schemas
refer to "the set of behaviors we expect[] of a person in a particular social position").
23 Medical research today is a multi-billion dollar industry. See Morreim, Litigation in
Clinical Research, supra note 5, at 474 ("[Clinical trials] have become a huge business.");
O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 349 ("Clinical research consumes an estimated four billion dollars
annually...." (citing OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.,
No. OEI-01-97-00191, INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS: PROMISING APPROACHES at Al
(1998))); Kurt Eichenwald & Gina Kolata, Drug Trials Hide Conflicts for Doctors, N.Y.
TIMES, May 16, 1999, at Al (reporting that researchers earn up to one million dollars per
year).
24 The commercialization of science increases incentives and temptations to commit bad
acts. As one respected ethicist reports, "In countless discussions with research scientists, I
have learned about their tampering with the principle of voluntary consent in order to get
research underway, advance science, and obtain research grants for the sake of protecting
their laboratories and professional advancement." Jay Katz, The Consent Principle of the
Nuremberg Code: Its Significance Then and Now, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE
NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 226,231 (George J. Annas
& Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992); see also Michael Baram, Making Clinical Trials Safer for
Human Subjects, 27 Am. J.L. & MED 253, 268-69 (2001) ("[P]rospects of financial gain are
so tempting that researchers and organizations are inadvertently or even deliberately
[violating] other FDA and NIH requirements intended to protect human subjects."). Doctors
and researchers report that the most frequent causes of research misconduct are pressures to
obtain funding, pressures of career advancement, pressure to publish and to produce results,
and pressure to succeed in a competitive environment. See JAMES A. WELLS, THE GALLUP
ORG., FINAL REPORT: OBSERVING AND REPORTING SUSPECTED MISCONDUCT IN BIOMEDICAL
RESEARCH 37 (2008), available at http://ori.dhhs.gov/research/intra/documents/gallup_

finalreport.pdf; O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 324 (noting "the patent law advantage of taking a
primary position for the innovator who patents a device first"); see also Lori A. Alvino,
Note, Who's Watching the Watchdogs? Responding to the Erosion of Research Ethics by
Enforcing Promises, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 893, 906-09 (2003) (discussing incentives that
facilitate the erosion of informed consent).
25 See JAMES M. LANG, LEARNING SICKNESS: A YEAR WITH CROHN'S DISEASE 40 (2004)
("Our society assigns doctors especially revered places of authority and respect."); Mark A.
Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463,478 (2002) ("[P]atients yearn to have
confidence in their doctors, to idealize them, to endow them with superhuman powers."
(quoting HERMAN MILES SOMERS & ANNE RAMSAY SOMERS, DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND
HEALTH INSURANCE: THE ORGANIZATION AND FINANCING OF MEDICAL CARE 459 (1961)));
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are perceived as healers and altruistic, honest actors who toil tirelessly for
the betterment of mankind. Evidence of this schema can be seen in
television portrayals and public opinion polls. 26 In 2006, for example, a
nationwide public opinion poll found that doctors and scientists are
amongst the most trusted of occupations and professions. 27 In fact, doctors
are the most trusted occupation and scientists among the top three, above
police officers and professors.28
The role schema applied to doctors and researchers creates the risk of
an idealization bias. This bias may affect how the acts of researchers are
judged. Individuals may interpret the culpable acts of researchers as
innocent mistakes or, at most, negligence, rather than as criminal. Hence,
the idealization of doctors may explain the reluctance to prosecute them
when they are involved in research misconduct.
The evolution of tort doctrine in informed consent cases provides some
evidence of this bias. Prior to the 1960s, courts strongly protected an
individual's autonomy interests by recognizing the torts of assault or
battery against doctors who either failed to adequately inform their patients
about the risks of treatment or failed to abide by the consent obtained.29
The attitude of courts during this period is best expressed by Justice
Cardozo's oft-quoted language: "Every human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body;

Valerie M. Harris, Being a Doctor: Pros, Cons and What It's Really Like, MoMMD,
http://www.mommd.com/beingadoctor.shtml (last visited Feb. 2, 2009) ("For centuries, the
physician has been one of the most respected members of society.").
26See Michael Pfau et al., The Influence of Television Viewing on Public Perceptions of
Physicians, 39 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 441 (1995). The Emmy and Peabody awardwinning drama House portrays a drug-addicted doctor who orders ethically problematic
medical procedures, often without permission, that he believes are necessary. He is depicted
as a medical genius whose acts can be forgiven because he obtains results. But see Rebecca
M. Chory-Assad & Ron Tamborini, Television Doctors: An Analysis of Physicians in
Fictionaland Non-Fictional Television Programs,45 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 499 (2001),

available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mim6836/is-3 45/ain25037085/pg-l?tag =
artBody;coll (finding that television portrayals, though still positive, are slightly less so than
in 1995).
27 THE HARRIS POLL, DOCTORS AND TEACHERS MOST TRUSTED AMONG 22 OCCUPATIONS

(2006),
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris-polI/index.asp?PID=688.
The poll was conducted
by telephone between July 7-10, 2006, among a nationwide sample of 1002 U.S. adults. Id.
28 Id. Scientists were trusted to be truthful by 77% of those surveyed, compared with
police officers at 76% and professors at 75%. Id. But see Tara Parker-Pope, Doctor and
Patient,Now at Odds, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 29, 2008, at F6.
29 See, e.g., Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 15-16 (Minn. 1905); Rolater v. Strain, 137
P. 96, 97-99 (Okla. 1913).
AND PROFESSIONS: FEWER ADULTS TRUST THE PRESIDENT TO TELL THE TRUTH
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and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent
commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages. 3 °
By recognizing the torts of assault or battery in informed consent
cases, courts placed the individual's right to self-determination at the fore.
Doctors were held liable for violations of consent, whether or not the
patient suffered any physical harm, because "the essence of the plaintiffs
grievance consists in the offense to the dignity involved in the unpermitted
. ,31
The
and intentional invasion of the inviolability of his person.. ...
doctor's good or bad faith was irrelevant because the injury justifying
compensation was to the patient's right to be free from non-consensual
contact with her person.32
However, in the 1960s and 1970s, courts began to shield doctors from
battery liability because they presumed that doctors were acting in good
faith and for the benefit of the patient. As one court put it:
We believe that medical treatment beyond the scope of a patient's consent should
not be considered as an intentional tort or species of assault and battery as it has been
viewed in the past. The doctor in a malpractice case is ordinarily not an actor who
intends to inflict an injury on his patient and any legal theory which presumes that
intent appears to be based upon an erroneous supposition. Instead, the doctor is not
one who acts antisociallyas one who commits assault and
33 battery, but is an actor who
in good faith intends to confer a benefit on the patient.

Idealizing doctors in this fashion caused courts to view the
consequences of battery liability as overly punitive.34 For example, if found
liable in battery, a doctor might be required to pay damages out of pocket
because malpractice insurance would not be available for "an arguably
'criminal' act.",35 Additionally, the possibility of an award of punitive

30 Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (citing Pratt v.

Davis, 79 N.E. 562 (Il. 1906)). Justice Cardozo is often cited as the source of the modem
doctrine of informed consent. Morris, supra note 5, at 317. But see Paul A. Lombardo,
Phantom Tumors and Hysterical Women: Revising Our View of the Schloendorff Case, 33
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 791, 791 (2005) ("[I]t would be surprising to find a serious commentator
who used the Schloendorff opinion as the foundation of an argument about the origins of
informed consent.").
31 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 cmt. c (1965) (emphasis added).

The tort

allows for nominal damages for the offensive contact and compensation for emotional
distress. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 9, at 35 (4th ed. 1971).
32 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 31, § 16, at 18; see Morreim, Litigation

in Clinical Research, supra note 5, at 483 n.81 ("[B]attery protects the purely dignitary
interest in the body that it be free from offensive contact." (citing Meisel, supra note 5, at
16)).
33 Dries v. Gregor, 424 N.Y.S.2d 561, 564 (App. Div. 1980) (citations omitted and
emphasis added).
34 Shultz, supra note 5, at 226.
35 Trogun v. Fruchtman, 207 N.W.2d 297, 313 (Wis. 1973).
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damages raised concerns. 36 Since courts presumed that doctors were acting
in good faith and for the benefit of the patient, these outcomes seemed
unduly harsh. Thus, courts began to treat non-consensual encroachments
upon the sanctity of the body as a form of medical malpractice sounding in
negligence.37
The concern for doctors appeared to overshadow
considerations of individual dignity, autonomy, and self-determination.
The courts' idealization of the medical profession persists even in
cases involving researchers who act in bad faith. For instance, Heinrich v.
Sweet3" was a class action lawsuit filed on behalf of terminally ill brain
cancer patients who were subjects in radiation experiments without their
knowledge. 39 The patients thought they were receiving treatment and were
unaware of the deception until a government report uncovering the
experiments was published over forty years later. 40 The plaintiffs sued in
battery, alleging that the. defendants "intentionally injected the class'
decedents with toxic substances and irradiated the class' decedents without
consent."4 1 The researchers acted in bad faith. The victims had not agreed
to become research fodder, or to be injected with the experimental
radioactive substance. However, despite evidence of intentional deceit, the
court dismissed the battery claim and held that the action should be treated
as a form of medical malpractice or negligence.4 2

36

See, e.g., id. Other reasons cited by the Trogun court include that the failures to

disclose do not constitute affirmative conduct and thus should not be conceptualized as an
intentional tort, or as the type of contact or touching required for an intentional tort. Id.
37 The claim "is in reality one for negligence in failing to conform to the proper standard,
to be determined on the basis of expert testimony as to what disclosure should be made."
PROSSER, supra note 31, § 32, at 165. See generally Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 7-8 (Cal.
1972) (holding that failure to warn of known risk sounds in negligence).
38 44 F. Supp. 2d408 (1999).
39 Id.
40

Id.at 411.

41 Heinrich ex rel. Heinrich v. Sweet, 49 F. Supp. 2d 27, 38 (D. Mass. 1999).
42

Id. Because the patients had consented to the procedure, but not to the injection of the

radiation, the court found that this was an action based upon a lack of informed consent.
Many courts utilize a negligence standard in cases involving a failure to obtain informed
consent. See, e.g.,
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. 1972); Cobbs, 502 P.2d 1, 7-8;
Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676 (R.I.
1972). A minority of jurisdictions allows medical battery claims for lack of informed
consent. See, e.g.,
Lloyd v. Kull, 329 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1964); Mink v. Univ. of Chicago,
460 F. Supp. 713, 718 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (citing Cathemer v. Hunter, 558 P.2d 975, 978 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1976)); Perry v. Shaw, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 70 (Ct. App. 2001); Gragg v. Calandra,
696 N.E.2d 1282 (I11.
App. Ct. 1998); Kus v. Sherman Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 1214 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995); Roberson v. Provident House, 576 So. 2d 992 (La. 1991); Duttry v. Patterson, 771
A.2d 1255 (Pa. 2001); Morgan v. MacPhail, 704 A.2d 617, 620 (Pa. 1997); Fiter v. IOLAB
Corp., 607 A.2d 1111 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Harvey v. Strickland, 566 S.E.2d 529 (S.C.
2002); Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726 (Tenn. 1998).
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Even in negligence cases, glimpses of idealization bias are present.
The majority of jurisdictions utilize the "medical custom" standard as the
basis for imposing liability. 43 In determining whether the right to informed

consent is breached, the focus of the inquiry is on what the medical
community believes is reasonable to disclose.4 4 Reliance upon medical
community standards assumes that the community will always act in good
faith and in furtherance of the best interests of the patient.
A growing number of jurisdictions utilize a standard that focuses upon
the information a reasonable person would want to receive in determining
liability. 45 The question asked is whether a reasonable person would have
consented to the procedure if he or she had been given the undisclosed
information. The use of the reasonable person standard again reflects a
concern for the idealized doctor because the standard was chosen to protect
doctors from the vindictive patient by avoiding placing doctors "in jeopardy
of the patient's hindsight and bitterness., 46 A subjective standard would
not the doctor, has the right to decide what is in
recognize that the patient,
47
interest.
best
his or her
That we idealize doctors, even those acting in bad faith, demonstrates
the efficacy of idealization bias. Indeed, such reverence overshadows
concern for the patient's right to make informed decisions about what is
done to her person and relegates protection of the individual's interests in
her bodily integrity to a secondary status.48 The idealization phenomenon is
43 See, e.g., Osbom v. Irwin Mem'l Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 124 (Ct. App.
1992) (noting that medical custom standard is the majority rule).

44id.
45 See Jaime Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The
Casefor Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 429, 430 (2006) (noting that

almost half ofjurisdictions utilize the reasonable patient standard).
46Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790-91. Only a minority of jurisdictions utilize a subjective
test, and do so in order to provide strong protection to individual autonomy and decisionMcPherson v. Ellis, 287 S.E.2d 892, 897 (N.C. 1982); Scott v. Bradford,
making. See, e.g.,
606 P.2d 554, 559 (Okla. 1980); Arena v. Gingrich, 748 P.2d 547, 549 (Or. 1988); Millard v.
Nagle, 587 A.2d 10, 13 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Flanagan v. Wesselhoeft, 712 A.2d 365, 370
(R.I. 1998).
47Canterbury,464 F.2d at 781 ("[I]t is the prerogative of the patient, not the physician,
to determine for himself the direction in which his interests seem to lie."); Id. at 786 ("[T]he
patient's right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the duty to reveal."). Only a few
jurisdictions utilize the subjective person standard. See Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d
1544, 1548-49 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Korman v. Mallin, 858 P.2d 1145, 1150-51 (Alaska 1993);
Lugenbuhl v. Dowling, 676 So. 2d 602, 605-06 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Macy v. Blatchford, 8
P.3d 204, 209-11 (Or. 2000).
48 Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost
Containment, 85 IOWA L. REV. 261, 366 (1999) ("[P]atients can be harmed when they are
prevented from making decisions about their own care, even when, or perhaps especially
when, no physical harm occurs."); see also Morreim, Litigation in ClinicalResearch, supra
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not new. For example, the long-standing therapeutic exception to informed
consent allows doctors, in their sole discretion, to withhold information
from a patient if they believe the information would cause psychological
harm and thus hurt the patient's physical well-being. 49 This exception
implicitly assumes doctors acting in good faith and failing to disclose
relevant information, not to serve their own ends, but for the benefit of the
patient.
Importantly, idealization bias can be overcome in individual cases.5 °
After all, some doctors are prosecuted for criminal conduct. However,
when these prosecutions occur, there is usually an explanation for why the
role schema was conquered. In some cases, the person's role as a doctor
was merely coincidental to the conduct. 5 ' In others, alternative schemas
were more salient. For example, the so-called War on Drugs likely
"primes" prosecutors and law enforcement to be ever vigilant for evidence
of improper drug distribution. Hence, doctors are prosecuted for allegedly
improperly prescribing narcotic painkillers to patients.53 In these cases, the
power of the War-on-Drugs prime can explain the ascendance of the drugdealer schema over the doctor schema. In sum, when doctors are
prosecuted, it appears that alternative schemas are more salient and thus
defeat idealization bias.54

note 5, at 480 ("Because standard informed consent doctrine limits recovery to cases
featuring a physical or other separate injury, it can fail to honor human autonomy in cases
where someone's right to choose has been abused without demonstrable physical damage."
(footnote omitted)).
49 See, e.g., Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170,
181 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1957). In Salgo, the court held that a risk which was remote did not have to be
disclosed if, in the doctor's sole judgment, the patient would become so terrified that she
would fail to obtain the surgery the doctor thought was necessary. Id. This is known as the
"therapeutic exception" to informed consent. Because the doctor's duty is to "place the
welfare of [the] patient above all else," the patient's right to autonomy in decision-making
could be limited. Id.; see also Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788-89 (upholding the therapeutic
exception).
50 Chen & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1175-77.
"I This occurs when a doctor is prosecuted for rape or murder, for example.
52 Priming "'refers to any experiences or procedures that bring a particular concept (or
any other knowledge structure) to mind."' Chen & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1180 (citation
omitted).
53 See Press Release, U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., Doctor Charged with Illegal Drug
Distribution (July 2, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/states/newsrelU
atlanta070207.html.
54 In the social cognition field, this is often referred to as "subtyping." Subtyping allows
individuals to avoid reconceptualizing a schema, but rather create exceptions to the general
rule. Chen & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1205 ("When confronted with disconfirming
information individuals can carve out a special subschema for that evidence in a way that
preserves more general schema-like an 'exception that proves the rule."').
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B. SOCIAL BENEFIT BIAS

Another explanation for the failure to prosecute culpable researchers is
that they are engaged in socially beneficial research.55 Researchers perform
a service that society believes is worthy, beneficial, and important.

Generally, our society accepts the practice of human subject research,
despite the fact that serious injury and death can result, 56 because it may
lead to cures or treatments for devastating diseases.57 The desire to foster
research that holds the promise of substantial potential benefits may create a
willingness to turn a blind eye to intentional misconduct or an unawareness
that one's interpretation of conduct is influenced by the motivation to
encourage research.5 8 This is what I refer to as social benefit bias.
Social cognition research establishes that an individual's motivations
can play a significant role in determining "which concepts, beliefs, and
rules we apply to a judgment; we may be especially likely to apply those
that are congruent with our goals." 59 In fact, motivations may be the most
important factor affecting the schema an individual adopts. 60 The failure to
punish culpable researchers may stem from fear that punishment would
stymie medical research that we are motivated to promote. This desire to

55Researchers have been prosecuted for falsifying data. See infra note 98. But these
prosecutions make sense since in neither instance is society benefited. Results based upon
falsified data will not result in knowledge that helps develop cures or treatments for diseases,
for example.
56 Experiments involving human subjects can be therapeutic or non-therapeutic.
Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 637 F. Supp. 1463, 1467 (M.D.N.C. 1986). Therapeutic
experimentation provides a benefit to the subject, while non-therapeutic experimentation
does not. Id. Many subjects in non-therapeutic research are healthy. Id.
57 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, OTA-BA-337, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS 56 (1987) ("There are nearly
350 commercial biotechnology firms in the United States actively engaged in biotechnology
research and commercial product development and approximately 25 to 30 percent appear to
be engaged in research to develop a human therapeutic or diagnostic reagent ....Most, but
not all, of the human therapeutic products are derived from human tissues and cells, or
human cell lines or cloned genes."). Already, tests and treatments for diseases such as
leukemia, cancer, diabetes, hepatitis-B, and infertility exist as a result of this important
research. ALAN M. RUSSELL, THE BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION: AN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE (1988), cited in Thomas P. Dillon, Note, Source Compensationfor Tissues and
Cells Used in Biotechnical Research: Why a Source Shouldn't Share in the Profits, 64
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 628, 628 n. 1 (1989).
58 Individuals also may underestimate the possibility that they will become the victims of
research misconduct. Psychological studies reveal that individuals have an inclination to be
overconfident or overly optimistic when it comes to making risk assessments for themselves.
Rachlinski, supra note 13, at 1172, 1191; Sunstein, supra note 13, at 1183 (discussing
systematic overconfidence in risk judgments).
59Chen & Hanson, supra note 13, at 1183 n.341 (citation omitted).
60 Id. at 1183 (citation omitted).
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advance research may affect how decision-makers interpret researchers'
conduct and victims' harm.
Perhaps the best example of social benefit bias, and its close
relationship to idealization bias, is Moore v. Regents of the University of
California, a case involving surreptitious research.61 Mr. Moore had a rare
and deadly cancer known as hairy-cell leukemia in his spleen. 62 He sought
treatment from Dr. David Golde, a prominent cancer specialist at the UCLA
Medical Center. He gave Dr. Golde permission to conduct a splenectomy
(the surgical removal of his spleen) to treat his leukemia. After the
successful procedure,63 Moore moved to Seattle.64
When Dr. Golde asked Moore to return for follow-up treatments,
Moore was not suspicious. For the next seven years, Moore dutifully flew
from Seattle to California every few months, and underwent sometimes
painful medical procedures that included withdrawing samples of
"blood,. . . skin, bone marrow aspirate, and sperm., 65 He made the trek
66
because Dr. Golde asserted that the procedures were medically necessary
and that only he could perform them.6 7 Neither assertion was true.
What Moore did not know was that prior to his surgery, Dr. Golde had
developed research and financial interests in Moore's cells. 68 The
procedures Dr. Golde performed after the successful surgery had nothing to
do with treating Moore's leukemia, which was in remission. Instead, Dr.
Golde was actively conducting research on Moore's cells solely for
financial gain and commercial advantage. Dr. Golde exploited the doctorpatient relationship to ensure that he had exclusive access to Moore's
cells.69 When Moore specifically asked Dr. Golde whether there was any
possible research interest or financial benefit in his bodily substances, Dr.
Golde repeatedly told him no and "actively discouraged such inquiries. 7 °
to say that "there was no commercial or
In fact, Dr. Golde went so far as 71
tissue.
Moore's
in
financial value"

61 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
62 Id. at 481.
63 Id.
64 Rebecca Skloot, Taking the Least of You, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 16, 2006, at 39, 41
availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/16/magazine/16tissue.html.
65 Moore, 793 P.2d at 481 (internal quotation marks omitted); Skloot, supra note 64, at 2.
66 Moore, 793 P.2d at 481.
67 id.
68

id.

id.
70 Id. at 486 (internal quotation marks omitted).
71 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

69

2009]

WHEN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION IS CRIMINAL

103

Dr. Golde never asked Moore for express consent to the removal of his
blood and tissue.12 However, at the close of seven years, Dr. Golde asked
him to sign a consent form giving UCLA permission to use the withdrawn
tissue for research purposes.73 Dr. Golde presented the consent form as a
mere formality and Moore signed.74 However, Moore became suspicious
when, after he later declined to sign a similar consent form, Dr. Golde
offered to pay for his airfare and accommodations at a ritzy Beverly Hills
hotel.75
Moore hired a lawyer.7 6 During his investigation, the lawyer
discovered that Dr. Golde had obtained a patent on the cell line developed
from Moore's cells. 77 He learned that Dr. Golde had a contract with a
biotechnology company that gave Dr. Golde stocks and financing worth
more than $3.5 million to "commercially develop" and "scientifically
investigate" the cell line. 78 The market value of the cell line was predicted
to reach $3 billion.79 Upon learning of the deception, Moore said that he
felt "violated for dollars," "invaded," and "raped., 80 Moore sued Dr. Golde
for conversion. 81 His lawsuit was dismissed by the trial court, reinstated by
the court of appeals, and finally made its way to the California Supreme
Court.
Over strongly worded dissents, the majority refused to extend
conversion liability to Moore's situation. It acknowledged that the tort of
conversion would protect individual autonomy. 82 However, the court

72

Michelle J. Burke & Victoria M. Schmidt, Old Remedies in the Biotechnology Age:

Moore v. Regents I, MAG. INTELL. PROP. & TECH.,

Oct. 27,

2006, available at

http://www.piercelaw.edu/risk/vol3/summmer/moore.htm.
73 id.

74Id.

75Id. During that trip, Moore told Dr. Golde that he no longer had a place to stay in Los
Angeles. Id. Moore became suspicious because Dr. Golde seemed "overeager" to pay for
his accommodations, Dr. Golde made numerous attempts to obtain his signature on the
consent form, and Dr. Golde was evasive when asked about any commercial use of his
tissue. Id.
76 ANDREWS & NELKIN, supra note 5, at 27.
77Id. at 28. The lawyer discovered this by reading an article published by Dr. Golde in
Science describing the patent. Id.
78 Skloot, supra note 64, at 2.
79 Id.
80 ANDREWS

& NELKIN, supra note 5, at 28.

81 His complaint stated thirteen causes of action, including lack of informed consent and

breach of fiduciary duty. Burke & Schmidt, supra note 72.
82 See Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 494 (Cal. 1990) ("To be sure,
the threat of liability for conversion might help to enforce patients' rights indirectly. This is
because physicians might be able to avoid liability by obtaining patients' consent, in the
broadest possible terms, to any conceivable subsequent research use of excised cells.").
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decided against extending the theory to the medical research context
because recognition would "create[] disincentives to the conduct of socially
beneficial research" that was "of importance to all of society ...."83 In so
holding, the court touted protection of "innocent researchers" despite84 the
fact that Dr. Golde was not an innocent researcher acting in good faith.
Invocation of the innocent researcher ideal demonstrates the
sometimes intimate relationship between the social benefit and idealization
biases. The entire court agreed that Dr. Golde deliberately failed to obtain
consent in order to mine Moore's body for cells in furtherance of Dr.
Golde's financial interests. Despite this, the majority's primary concern
was to avoid stymieing socially useful conduct.85
The Moore decision marks an unwillingness to recognize insults to
human dignity that result from intentional fraud. What appears to
distinguish the Moore case from a typical assault or fraud case,86
customarily subject to the criminal sanction, is the potential social benefit
of the researcher's conduct and a fear that recognition of Moore's interests
would stymie future research.
Researchers engaged in intentional misconduct have taken advantage
of social benefit bias, intentionally or unintentionally, to deflect attention
83 Id. at 494, 487. See also id. at 499 (noting that the majority was concerned that "the

imposition of liability for conversion will impede medical research by innocent scientists
who use the resources of existing cell repositories" but that this was "a factual setting not
presented here .. ")(Broussard, J.,concurring and dissenting); see also id. at 513 n.14
(Mosk, J., dissenting) ("On this record the majority's solicitude for the protection of
'innocent parties' seems ironic. The complaint is replete with factual allegations ... to the
effect that defendants repeatedly lied to Moore about their commercial exploitation of his
tissue."). For further commentary on the Moore case, see Michelle Bourianoff Bray,
PersonalizingPersonalty: Toward a PropertyRight in Human Bodies, 69 TEX. L. REV. 209,
233-239 (1990); Dillon, supra note 57, at 631-32.
84 Moore, 793 P.2d at 497.
85 The court did allow Mr. Moore to proceed on his claim of violation of informed
consent. However, this remedy is illusory for individuals, such as Moore, who do not suffer
actual harm. See Krause, supra note 48, 366-67; Morreim, Litigation in ClinicalResearch,
supra note 5, at 480 ("[A] number of scholars have recommended that serious deficiencies of
informed consent be deemed a distinct dignitary tort."); Morris, supra note 5, at 330-31;
Shultz, supra note 5, at 225. But see Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
136, 152 (1992) ("Courts are beginning to compensate for infringements of the
decisionmaking process, even if the tangible injury is not one that the law recognizes.").
86No criminal charges were ever brought against Dr. Golde. Dr. Golde's actions are
similar to routinely prosecuted assaults. To make this determination, this Article refers to
the Model Penal Code because state statutes differ in their definitions of crimes. An
"assault" occurs when an actor "knowingly ...causes bodily injury to another .... MODEL
PENAL CODE § 211.1 (1962). "Bodily injury" includes physical pain. Id. § 210.0(2). When
Dr. Golde performed medical procedures on Mr. Moore for seven years without his
permission, he caused physical pain, and he was aware that physical pain was practically
certain to occur. Id. § 2.02(2)(b)(ii) (defining "knowingly").
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away from their bad acts, demonize the victim, and shape public opinion.
They have become "availability entrepreneurs ' '87 who can package events to
benefit from social benefit bias. For example, in defending against
accusations that his surreptitious mining of Moore's body was for his own
financial benefit, Dr. Golde stated: "If there is economic gain, it will be to
the people of California.,1 8 Dr. Golde's attorney described Moore to others
as "an ingrate., 89 "Golde saved Moore's life. . . . 'Most people would
embrace the doctor with all the gratitude they have."' 90 One newspaper
reported, "Moore's suit has raised the passions of the scientific community,
which wams that if he is successful he will strike a blow against future
medical research." 91 It is not surprising, then, that the general public, who
stand to reap the benefits of research, are affected. As one letter to the
editor stated:
While I am not given to emotional outbursts over the numerous atrocities we
humans seem hellbent on committing against one another, I was compelled to
comment on the article "Medical Community Rocked by Tissue-Ownership Battle"
[Jan. 8]. Instead of hoping the medical community might one day save a life with
their research, it appears John Moore and his lawyers have regressed to the ultimate in
greed and self-degradation. While not always a staunch supporter of many of today's
medical advances and research tactics, I nonetheless believe these advances will
ultimately benefit mankind in the long run. The only hope I was left with after
reading this article was that the research conducted on Mr. Moore's spleen would one
day prove vital and essential to extending the lives of Mr.Moore and his law ers, and
that they would be denied this life-extending help solely for financial reasons.

Hints of social benefit bias can also be seen in the failure to
acknowledge systematically and consistently the history of research
misconduct that accompanies many important medical advances,
procedures, and products. For example, Dr. James Marion Sims is
recognized as the "father of American gynecology" and revered as a
benefactor of women, having opened the first hospital in the nation for the
care of women in New York City and dedicated his career to the treatment

87

Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law

and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 13, at 13, 38.
88Robert Reinhold, Ruling Raises Fear of Research Curbs, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1988, at
15.
89 Frank Swoboda, It Was My Spleen, and Now It Could Be Anywhere, WASH. POST, Jan.
26, 1988, at HElO (statement of Anthony Murray, attorney).
90

Id.

91 Id.
92

Diane M. Burrows, Letter to the Editor, John Moore's Spleen, WASH. POST, Jan. 14,

1989, at A22.
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of women's disorders.93 Hospitals carry his name, and marble monuments
bearing his likeness and accolades stand in prominent locations. 94
Very rarely, however, does anyone acknowledge the history of his
abuse of female slaves, which formed the basis of his extensive knowledge.
In the 1840s, Dr. Sims performed surgeries on enslaved girls and women in
an attempt to perfect an operation to treat white women suffering from a
painful vaginal condition. He performed excruciatingly painful surgery on
his captives to create the condition, without the use of anesthesia, and
forced them to take turns restraining each other as he made incisions, since
other doctors could not stomach their "bone-chilling shrieks." 95 This is how
he perfected the procedure, published his results in a prestigious medical
96
journal, and became known as the "father of American gynecology."
Importantly, this observation is not meant to condemn the use of the
knowledge he gained (this Article offers no opinion on that question), but
rather to point out that the silence regarding his methods is perhaps the
result of a desire to enjoy the fruits of his labor without the constant
reminder of the methods used to obtain them. A similar phenomenon is
present in the ongoing debate over the morality of utilizing the medical
knowledge obtained from the torture of concentration camp victims by the
Nazis.

97

In conclusion, both idealization bias and social benefit bias may
explain why researchers engaged in misconduct escape punishment.9 8 They
93 HARRIET A. WASHINGTON, MEDICAL APARTHEID: THE DARK HISTORY OF MEDICAL

61
(Doubleday 2006) (2006).
94 Id. at 1.
" Id. at 65.
96 Id. at 66.
97 George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin, Introduction to THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE
NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 24, at 3, 5 (citations omitted); see also Alan C. Nixon, If the
Data's Good, Use It-Regardless of the Source, THE SCIENTIST, Nov. 14, 1988, at 8
(defending the use of Nazi data).
98 Researchers are often prosecuted for filing false claims with the government under the
mail and wire fraud statutes. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006) (false claims); 18 U.S.C. § 1343
(2006) (wire fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006) (mail fraud); see, e.g., United States ex rel.
Cantekin v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 192 F.3d 402 (3d Cir. 1999) (same); United States ex rel.
Berge v. Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453 (4th Cir. 1998) (same); United States ex rel. Chandler
v. Hektoen Inst. for Med. Research, 118 F. Supp. 2d 902 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (same); United
States v. Univ. of Cal., 912 F. Supp. 868 (D. Md. 1995) (same); United States v. Breuning,
No. K-88-0135 (D. Md. Sept. 19, 1988) (cited in Bratislav Stankovic, Pulp Fiction:
Reflections on Scientific Misconduct, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 975, 985 (2004)) (false claims);
United States. v. Keplinger, 776 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1985) (mail fraud). These prosecutions
present further evidence of the social benefit bias. Some of these prosecutions occur in cases
where researchers falsify efficacy data during the course of research. See, e.g., United States
v. Smith, 740 F.2d 734 (9th Cir. 1984) (involving researchers who made false statements
EXPERIMENTATION ON BLACK AMERICANS FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 1,
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are not viewed as criminals deserving of punishment. In Part III below, this
Article begins a discussion on whether criminal punishment is appropriate
for researcher misconduct. It does so by exploring the expressive harms
that can result when an identifiable group of culpable actors are not
punished through use of the criminal sanction.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT

Punishing culpable researchers would send a clear message: violations
of autonomy and dignity are wrong whether or not they take place in the
context of socially beneficial research. 99 But that begs the question-what
is punishment? This Article subscribes to the familiar view that what
distinguishes punishment from other penalties is that punishments express
moral condemnation.' 00 According to philosopher Joel Feinberg's wellknown formulation, punishment is a "conventional device for the
expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of
disapproval and reprobation, on the part either of the punishing
authority... or of those 'in whose name' the punishment is inflicted."' 01
Under this definition, a necessary condition of punishment is that it
expresses censure, judgment, and disapproval in a socially conventional
manner.

Viewed in this way, punishment is not necessarily limited to the
criminal sanction. If other penalties are understood to carry similar
messages of denunciation and disapproval, they too could constitute
punishment. Subpart A scrutinizes the expressive meaning of criminal
punishment. Subpart B then considers whether alternative sanctions carry
the same expressive meaning as the criminal sanction, and concludes that
they do not.

concerning efficacy of investigational drugs); Beverly Merz, Many Address Task of
Preventing Research Fraud,260 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 2011, 2011 (1988) (discussing the case
of Dr. Breuning, Ph.D., who plead guilty to providing false efficacy data to the National
Institute of Mental Health). Such misconduct places society at risk because the tested
product may be, in fact, unsafe. However, the failure to prosecute cases in which individuals
are injured can be explained by the fact that the harm to the individual subject arguably leads
to better data, resulting in a safer product.
99Galanter and Luban refer to this as "norm projection." Marc Galanter & David Luban,
Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1429
(1993). They argue that "an important aim of punishment is to dramatize publicly that legal
norms are seriously intended. That is, punishment prevents offenses by norm projection and
norm reinforcement as well as by deterrence." Id.
100See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING &
DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 98 (1970); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The

Aims of the CriminalLaw, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 401,404 (1958).
101 FEINBERG, supra note 100, at 98 (emphasis added).
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A. WHAT CRIMINAL SANCTIONS EXPRESS
How a society conventionally expresses censure is important. For
example, Dan Kahan argues that verbally castigating a wrongdoer could be
considered punishment if social norms within the community make it
appropriately condemnatory.10 2 In our society, the criminal sanction' 0 3 is
viewed, uncontroversially, as the most serious statement of moral
blameworthiness. In his famous treatise, Henry Hart asserted that what
differentiates criminal punishment from the civil remedy is "the judgment
of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its
imposition."'' 0 4 The criminal sanction is the socially conventional method
for expressing public censure, 0 5 and is well understood in this society as a
way for the state to condemn an act and to disavow it. 106 Use of the
criminal sanction may not be the07only way to punish, or the best way, but in
our society, it is the usual way.1
One feature of the sanction that makes it a unique method of
expressing moral censure is the stigma that attaches to the individual. As
one commentator describes it: "In modem criminal law, the stigma of a
criminal sanction has become a special kind of remedy because of its
burdensome and sometimes destructive consequences for the individual."'' 0 8
The stigma is not limited to a conviction. The state's decision to charge an
individual also carries meaning, for it expresses that the accused probably
deserves moral censure because his acts justify placing him at risk of a
conviction and its attendant consequences. This explains the feelings of
shame and humiliation that often accompany a criminal charge.

102Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 600
(1996).
103In this Article, the phrase "the criminal sanction" or "criminal punishment" are used
to refer to the act of charging someone with an offense as well as any resulting conviction
and consequences, including imprisonment, fines, probation, or community service.
104 Hart, supra note 100, at 404. Others have also recognized the special nature of
criminal punishment. See, e.g., Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground
Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795,

1808 (1992)

("The principal

paradigmatic purpose of the criminal law-the reason for invoking criminal law rather than
some alternative sanctioning system-is punishment.").
105 FEINBERG, supra note 100, at 98.
106 Id. at 102.
107I have paraphrased Hugo Bedau here. See Hugo Adam Bedau, Feinberg's Liberal
Theory of Punishment, 5 BUFF. CRiM. L. REV. 103, 125 (2001) ("'Punishment... might be
deserved by the criminal only because it is the customary way of expressing the resentment
or reprobation he 'has coming.' Not, mind you, the only way, or the best way-just the
usual way.").
108Mann, supra note 104, at 1809.
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Furthermore, the criminal brand continues to express condemnation
long after it is imposed. Except in rare circumstances, 10 9 a person convicted
of a crime must, for the remainder of his life, inform others of his
culpability and blameworthiness by disclosing his conviction on
employment, education, housing, and licensing applications. A conviction
110
In many
also has political, economic, and social consequences.
instances, it results in the loss of the rights to vote and to carry a weapon,
and of the ability to obtain public benefits, live in certain neighborhoods,
and engage in certain types of employment. These are just a few collateral
consequences of a conviction.
When the state utilizes the criminal sanction, it "goes on record" and
"testif[ies] to the recognition" that the conduct in question is wrong and the
offender is deserving of condemnation and reprobation."' The use of the
sanction "tells the world that [the offender] had no right to do what he did,
that he was on his own in doing it, that his government does not condone
that sort of thing."' "12 Through criminal punishment, the state vindicates the
victim's value or worth." 13 The victim has been wronged, and the state is
stepping up to defend her honor, so to speak."4
The state's failure to utilize this powerful method of condemnation is
also expressive. "What a community chooses to punish and how severely
tells us what (or whom) it values and how much."' 1 5 When the state
permits an identifiable group to commit criminal acts without punishment,
16
the offender,
it sends a message of official complicity and solidarity with

109Juvenile adjudications and expungements are exceptions, although even these
protections are not always perfect. See Carrie T. Hollister, The Impossible Predicament of
Gina Grant, 44 UCLA L. REV. 913 (1997) (discussing sealed-record statutes for juveniles
and their problems); Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate: In Praiseof a
Forgotten Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705 (2003) (discussing

expungements).
110DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 6 (2008)

(citing Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on
CollateralSentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 153 (1999)).

111
FEINBERG,

supra note 100, at 103.

102.
113 See Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in
112 Id. at

RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS

CRITICS 1, 15 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992).
114Lawrence Friedman, Essay in Defense of Corporate CriminalLiability, 23 HARv. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 833, 842 (2000) ("[T]he commission of an act the community, through its

laws, deems wrong should be met with disapprobation for the sake of the victim and the sake
of the community.").
115Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 609, 615 (1998).
116 JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 131 (1988) ("[W]e

would be accomplices in the crime if we failed to punish its perpetrator, because we would
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approval of the conduct,1 17 and disassociation from the victim. As a result,
wrongdoers may believe that they are entitled to act as they did.
Punishment is meant to humble the offender, to make him feel some inner
experience of humiliation and shame,' 18 in order to "annul or counter" the
message sent by his conduct.11 9 Letting the offender "get away with it"
may lead to further bad acts as offenders and potential offenders come to
believe that their treatment of the victim or class of victims is
permissible.12 °
The problems associated with failing to punish are apparent in the
treatment of a well-known and respected researcher and professor, Dr.
Albert Kligman. In 1951, Dr. Kligman, a professor of dermatology at the
University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine, was called to Holmesburg
Prison to treat an outbreak of athlete's foot. 12 1 Describing how he felt when
he first arrived at the prison, Dr. Kligman exclaimed, "All I saw before me
were acres of skin. It was like a farmer seeing a fertile field for the first
time. '
For the next twenty-five years, Dr. Kligman conducted
experiments on prisoners 123 for the benefit of at least thirty-three major
pharmaceutical and cosmetic companies, including Merck, DuPont, and
Johnson & Johnson. 124 He also created his own company to personally
profit from his research 125 and became a millionaire after he created the
126
anti-acne medication Retin-A as a result of his research.
The prisoners were not fully or accurately informed about the nature of
the experiments conducted on them. 12'As one explained, "We were never
be condoning the evidence it gave us of the relative worth of victim and offender ... we
would be acquiescing in the message it sent about the victim's inferiority.").
117FEINBERG,

supra note 100, at 101-03.

118Hampton, supra note 113, at 1,15.
119MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 116, at 124-28, 130.

"To inflict on a wrongdoer

something comparable to what he inflicted on the victim is to master him in the way that he
mastered the victim. The score is even .... Hence the lex talionis calls for a wrongdoer to
be subjugated in a way that symbolizes his being the victim's equal." Id. at 128.
120 See also Hampton, supra note 113, at 6 (explaining how crime demeans a victim's
worth); cf Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of
Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1679 (1992) (explaining that allowing the propagation
of books that assert the superiority of one race or sex can be dangerous because people may
"come to believe [their] assertions of superiority" and act on those beliefs).
121 WOLFGANG WEYERS, THE ABUSE OF MAN: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF DUBIOUS
MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION 426
122 WASHINGTON, supra note
123 WEYERS,

(2003).
93, at 249.

supra note 121, at 427.
supra note 93, at 249.

124WASHINGTON,
125WEYERS,

supra note 121, at 543-44.

126WASHINGTON,
127WEYERS,

supra note 93, at 249.

supra note 121, at 435.
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128
told what was going on. We never had [a copy of] anything we signed."'
One of Dr. Kligman's students acknowledged that "uninformed patients
were the rule," 129 and Dr. Kligman admitted, "It was years before the
authorities knew that I was conducting various studies on prisoner
volunteers .... No one asked me what I was doing. It was a wonderful
time."130
Dr. Kligman faced no lasting repercussions for his conduct, even after
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) discovered his questionable
practices. The FDA initiated an investigation after Dr. Kligman published
an article that described covering inmates' torsos with an industrial solvent
that the FDA had banned from human tests. 13 1 The FDA investigation
revealed additional questionable practices. 132 Consequently, the agency
banned Dr. Kligman from receiving and testing investigational drugs on
human subjects. 133 This was only the second time in its history that the
FDA used this sanction. 134 However, prominent doctors and researchers
1 35
spoke out in his defense and pressured the FDA to reverse its decision.
Less than a month later, the FDA gave in to the pressure. 3 6 The agency's
capitulation sent a clear message to Dr. Kligman and the research
community that his actions were condoned.
Dr. Kligman received that message. He recently stated, "My view is

that shutting the prison experiments down was a big mistake ....

I still

137
don't see there having been anything wrong with what we were doing."
He is still praised for his prison work 38 and currently sits on the ethics

128 WASHINGTON,

supra note 93, at 245 (quoting Jesse Williams's statement during a

2004 interview with Washington).
129 WEYERS, supra note 121, at 435.
t30 WASHINGTON,

supra note 93, at 251.

Problematically, at the time of these

experiments, the United States had already adopted guidelines for research that required
informed consent. See WEYERS, supra note 121, at 381.
131 WASHINGTON, supra note 93, at 250; WEYERS, supra note 121, at 556. The results
were published in the Journalof the American Medical Association in 1965. WEYERS, supra

note 121, at 556.
132 His experiments included burning his captives with radiation, immersing their body

parts in tanning chemicals, and applying acid to their scrotums until the skin fell away.
WASHINGTON, supra note 93, at 244. Many of the victims still bear physical scars. Id.
133 WASHINGTON, supra note 93, at 250; WEYERS, supra note 121, at 558.

134 WEYERS, supra note 121, at 558-59.
' Id. at 559-60.
136 Id. at 558, 560; WASHINGTON, supra note 93, at 250.
137 Ian Urbina, PanelSuggests Using Inmates in Drug Trials, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2006,
at 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/13/us/I3inmates.html.
138 WEYERS,

supra note 121, at 616.
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committee at the University of Pennsylvania
medical school 13 9 where he is
40
an emeritus professor of dermatology. 1
The failure to punish creates expressive harms. "A person suffers
expressive harm when she is treated according to principles that express
negative or inappropriate attitudes toward her."'141 When researchers are
permitted to commit criminal acts against individuals without punishment,
it sends the message that research subjects can be harmed to serve the ends
of research. The state's failure to act makes this message all the more
powerful because "the state is-or at least purports to be-an impartial
agent of morality, with greater capacity to recognize the moral facts than
any involved individual citizen."' 142 To paraphrase John Braithwaite, what
is needed is punishment that maximizes the sense of shame and
communicates the message that crime in human experimentation "isas
14 3
abhorrent to the community as crime in the streets."
B. SCRUTINIZING THE ALTERNATIVES
If punishments are "sanctions ...expressing public reprobation and
moral censure of the harm-causing wrongdoer,"' 144 then civil liability and
institutional penalties may not constitute punishment. This Subpart argues
that these commonly used alternatives to the criminal sanction in the human
experimentation context are not conventionally understood as expressing
moral condemnation as dramatically and unequivocally as does criminal
45
punishment. 1
1. Civil Liability
Generally, civil liability is viewed as a means to compensate an injured
victim and return her to the status quo ante, as opposed to a punitive
139Id.

See Urbina, supranote 137.
Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA.L. REV. 1503, 1527-28 (2000). Expressive harms can occur whether
or not communication is intended. Id. at 1529-30. "An expressive harm... results from the
ideas or attitudes expressed through a governmental action, rather than from the more
tangible or material consequences the action brings about ....[T]he very meaning they
convey demonstrates inappropriate respect .. " Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi,
Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District
Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 506-07 (1993).
142 Hampton, supra note 113, at 1693.
140
141

143JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 143 (1989).
144JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING 12 (1988).
145Kahan, supra note 102, at 593. My only argument is that today, these alternative
sanctions do not carry the same expressive message as criminal punishment. I do not
express an opinion about whether other sanctions, such as shaming, are better alternatives.
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device.146 Unlike criminal punishment, tort liability is not reserved for
culpable actors; even accidental conduct can result in a compensatory
damages award. 147 Setting aside the issue of punitive damages for a
moment, compensatory damages do not express moral censure in the same
way as criminal punishment, and thus do not carry the same stigma.
Whether a harm is the result of an accident, negligence, or an intentional
act, the amount of compensatory damages remains the same.
Additional factors explain why the social meaning of civil liability is
different from that of the criminal sanction. First, criminal defendants are
afforded constitutional procedural protections such as proof beyond a
reasonable doubt and the right to counsel. The absence of such procedural
protections in civil proceedings expresses the seriousness of criminal
punishment relative to civil liability. 148 Second, a finding of civil liability is
not accompanied by the risk of imprisonment or the collateral consequences
of a criminal conviction. Accordingly, civil defendants are not humbled to
the same extent as are criminal defendants. Criminal punishment expresses
blame and reprobation, a message that is largely absent from an award of

146 See Mann, supra note 104, at 1799 (stating that the paradigmatic distinction between
the criminal and civil law is that "the criminal law is distinguished by its punitive purposes,
its high procedural barriers to conviction, its concern with the blameworthiness of the
defendant, and its particularly harsh sanctions. In contrast, the civil law is defined as a
compensatory scheme, focusing on damage rather than on blameworthiness, and providing
less severe sanctions and lower procedural safeguards than the criminal law."). This is not to
say that the civil remedy can never result in opprobrium. Rather, the criminal conviction
results in stigma more often than the civil remedy. See, e.g., Lawrence Friedman, In Defense
of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 833, 854 (2000)
("Notwithstanding the retributive character of some aspects of civil liability (a punitive
damage award, for example), only criminal liability is understood against the background of
social norms, codified by the criminal law, as conveying the particular moral condemnation
that expressive retribution contemplates."); see also J. Morris Clark, Civil and Criminal
Penaltiesand Forfeitures:A Frameworkfor ConstitutionalAnalysis, 60 MINN. L. REv. 379,
407 (1976) ("One might conceptualize the difference between civilly and criminally labeled
penalties by stating that most people see in civil penalties an element of deterrence, but not a
very strong element of retribution or moral condemnation."). But see Galanter & Luban,
supra note 99, at 1404-07 (arguing that the public often associateg the civil sanction with
punishment). There are other civil remedies such as injunctions, forfeitures, and specific
performance. However, this Article only discusses compensatory and punitive damages
because they are most often sought in cases involving mistreatment of human subjects.
147 One instance in which tort liability carries a stigma is when it is brought in response
to a failure to convict the defendant of a crime. However, even in such cases, the stigma is
connected to the criminal sanction and is viewed as a substitute for the failure to obtain the
desired criminal conviction. For example, to the extent that there was a stigma attached to
the award of civil (wrongful death) damages against O.J. Simpson, it is likely associated
with the failure to convict him in his criminal murder trial.
148 See Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the
Criminal-CivilProceduralDivide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 808 (1997).
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compensatory damages. In fact, far from being humbled or stigmatized,
compensatory damages express to wrongdoers that they are privileged to
act, subject only to possible payment later in the form of damages.' 49 Thus,
the compensatory damages remedy allows wrongdoers to convert property
rules into liability rules at will. 5 ' Finally, even the players in the criminal
justice system recognize the symbolic-and practical-difference between
a judgment of guilt and a finding of liability.15 1 Although compensatory
damages may sometimes express condemnation, they are not the socially
conventional way of doing so.
The bulk of my discussion thus far has addressed the compensatory
damages component of tort liability. However, an award of punitive
damages is also possible. Punitive damages have been described as quasicriminal punishment and are reserved for culpable actors. 152 The Supreme
Court recognized that "[u]nlike compensatory damages,.... punitive
damages are specifically designed to exact punishment in excess of actual
harm to make clear that the defendant's misconduct was especially
reprehensible. Hence, there is a stigma attached to an award of punitive
' 53
damages that does not accompany a purely compensatory award.'
Punitive damages are a conventional device for expressing
condemnation. However, the relative strength of that condemnation is
weak compared to the condemnation expressed by the criminal sanction.
Punitive damages carry neither the possibility of imprisonment nor the
collateral consequences of criminal punishment. Moreover, punitive
damages are the subject of negative portrayals in the media as a result of the
tort reform movement. 154 The archetype stories of frivolous lawsuits that
are rewarded by out-of-control juries paint punitive damages awards as
149 See Robert Cooter, Pricesand Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1550 (1984) ("[I]f
crimes were priced, rather than sanctioned, people would be permitted to commit crimes
provided that they paid the price.").
150 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 HARv. L. REV. 1089, 1124-27 (1972).
151As a criminal defense lawyer, I often attempted to negotiate a civil settlement in lieu
of criminal prosecution.
152 Unlike compensatory damages, punitive damages require proof of a culpable mens
rea, such as malice. See Galanter & Luban, supra note 99, at 1407; Dan Markel, Retributive
Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
239 (2009).
153 See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 55 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); see also WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (5th
ed. 1984) (describing punitive damages as an "anomalous" situation demonstrating that "the
ideas underlying the criminal law have invaded the field of torts").
154See,
e.g.,
Am.
Tort
Reform
Ass'n,
Punitive
Damages
Reform,
http://www.atra.org/show/7343 (last visited Feb. 2, 2009) (discussing problems with punitive
damages awards from the perspective of an organization advocating tort reform).
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abuses of the legal System. 155 In other words, public perception of punitive
damages as disproportionate punishment has diluted their condemnatory
power.
Finally, courts can reduce punitive damages awards at their
discretion. 5 6 If reduced, the resulting damages may no longer humble and
shame the 57
offender.
Indeed, the reduction may even vindicate the
wrongdoer.'
Assuming that punitive damages do constitute punishment, there
remains an important use for criminal sanctions. Culpable acts injure
potential victims as well as actual victims. 58 Potential victims may fear
being subjected to future harms. 59 Unlike criminal sanctions, punitive
damages cannot be awarded to protect future victims. 60
Criminal
sanctions, on the other hand, punish wrongdoers for injury to actual victims
as well as injury to society as a whole.
In sum, compensatory damages do not express punishment, and the
social meaning of punitive damages is at best ambiguous. Use of the civil
sanction, as opposed to criminal punishment, expresses that the offender's
behavior does not deserve denunciation by the state. Thus, the state's
failure to charge researchers for crimes expresses an inappropriate attitude
towards the victim and the offender when compared to its willingness to
charge people with crimes for committing similar acts outside of the
medical research context. Arguably, these messages are exacerbated by the
155 See,

e.g., Galanter & Luban, supra note 99, at 1409-11; Legalzoom, Top Ten
Frivolous Lawsuits, http://www.legalzoom.com/legal-articles/top-ten-frivolous-lawsuits.html
(last visited Feb. 2, 2009) ("We've all heard the one about the woman who spilled scalding
coffee and successfully sued McDonald's.").
156 See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (finding punitive
damages award with a 500:1 ratio to compensatory damages excessive). Although the Court
has not placed constitutional limits on the ratio between actual and potential harm, it has
indicated that punitive damages awards that exceed a single-digit ratio with compensatory
damages will likely offend due process. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538
U.S. 408 (2003). Punitive damages awards have been reduced by courts in medical research
cases. See, e.g., Heinrich v. Sweet, 308 F.3d 48 (lst Cir. 2002).
157 See Hampton, supra note 120, at 1687-89 (discussing how the reduction in large
punitive damages awards may express the relative superiority of the offenders over those
injured).
158 See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 116, at 125 n.19 (stating that some moral
wrongs injure not only one individual, but society as a whole); Jerome Hall, Interrelationsof
Criminal Law and Torts: II, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 967, 969 (1943) ("[I]n torts, 'effects' almost
invariably include actual damage to some person, whereas in crimes, damage is not
essential-instead the notion of a 'social harm,' supplies the requirement there." (citation
omitted)).
159 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 58-71 (1974) (arguing that the

state is justified in establishing public institutions of criminal justice with respect to acts
which create a generalized sense of fear affecting persons other than actual victims).
160 See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
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too-frequent use of the criminal sanction as a normative response to
wrongful conduct. I do not advocate overcriminalization. However,
legislative eagerness to propose and pass new criminal laws and the use of
tough-on-crime rhetoric sends a message that the criminal sanction is the
only means of expressing societal condemnation.
Consequently,
overcriminalization has constructed a social reality that only criminal
sanctions are capable of truly punishing offenders and vindicating victims.
2. InstitutionalSanctions
Institutional sanctions also provide a means for protecting against
misconduct in human experimentation. Both the FDA and the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) play a role in protecting human subjects. 6 1 FDA
regulations govern clinical trials of drugs and devices for FDA approval.
Researchers who fail to comply with FDA regulations, such as informed
1 62
consent requirements,
may lose their entitlement to work with
163
drugs.
investigational
The NIH protects human subjects by conditioning its coveted research
grants. Recipients of NIH funds must sign an assurance of compliance with
human subject protection rules, including mandatory informed consent
procedures.1 64 Failure to comply with these requirements can result in
withdrawal of current funding and ineligibility for future grants. 161
Institutional sanctions can cause embarrassment, stigmatization,
reputational losses, and even affect a researcher's ability to work in his
chosen field. However, as serious as these consequences may be, they do
161

"Compliance with these parts is intended to protect the rights and safety of subjects

involved in [such] investigations .... " 21 C.F.R. § 50.1 (2008). For a general history of
existing regulations protecting human subjects, see Alvino, supra note 24, at 895-909.
162 21 C.F.R. § 50.20.
16321 C.F.R. § 312.70 (2008).
This revocation can be permanent, but is rarely
employed. See O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 345. The FDA can also issue a temporary or
lifetime bar from participating in the drug industry. 21 U.S.C. §§ 335a, 335b (2006)
(applying debarment only after a researcher has a qualifying conviction for a felony). The
FDA maintains a list of individuals and firms barred from participating in the drug industry,
and publishes this list in the federal register. FDA, Disqualified/Restricted/Assurances List
for Clinical Investigators, http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance-ref/bimo/dis res-assur.htm
(last visited Feb. 2, 2009); see also Tamar Nordenberg, Inside FDA: Barring Peoplefrom
the Drug Industry, FDA CONSUMER MAG., Mar. 1997, http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/
1997/297_debar.html (discussing debarment).
164 Public Health Service Act (PHSA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300 (2000).
The PHSA
establishes uniform regulations on informed consent, 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2008), and
delineates oversight responsibilities to Institutional Review Boards, 21 C.F.R. § 56.101
(2008); see also 45 C.F.R. § 46.103 (regulating the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the
Department of Health and Human Services, and the FDA).
165See 45 C.F.R. § 46.123.
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not necessarily express moral condemnation. Although an offender may
feel punished when his privilege to work in an industry is withdrawn,
institutional sanctions are not unambiguously
punishment and can even be
1 66
understood as purely remedial.
The following hypothetical illustrates the notion that institutional
sanctions are not punitive. Imagine a doctor who rapes his patient while
she is under anesthesia. Rather than prosecuting this doctor, the state
revokes his license. Most people would not consider this sanction a
sufficient expression of moral blame. Furthermore, wrongdoers in many
professional fields are simultaneously prosecuted and debarred from their
chosen field. For example, the state often prosecutes lawyers who have
already been disbarred. Thus, the failure to impose both criminal sanctions
and professional sanctions sends the message that researchers' misconduct
is undeserving of the most serious sanction.167
3. An Example of the Expressive FailuresofAlternative Sanctions
The death of Jesse Gelsinger during his participation in human subject
research provides an example of how civil liability and institutional
sanctions fail to send equivalent messages of blameworthiness and moral
culpability as criminal sanctions. Jessie died as a result of misconduct by
the head researcher in the experiment. Despite the existence of criminal
statutes prohibiting his conduct, the researcher was not prosecuted. 1 68 This
166 See Mann, supra note 104, at 1839 (arguing that monetary civil penalties over and

above compensation are unambiguously punishment, while nonmonetary penalties are
largely remedial). Some courts hold that the withdrawal of the privilege to work in a field is
simply remedial. See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 104 (1997) ("We have
long recognized that 'revocation of a privilege voluntarily granted,' such as a debarment, 'is
characteristically free of the punitive criminal element."' (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell,
303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938))); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (explaining that
while the individual is prohibited from further participation in the health care industry, this is
"certainly nothing approaching the 'infamous punishment' of imprisonment"); United States
v. Bizzell, 921 F.2d 263, 267 (10th Cir. 1990) ("It is the clear intent of debarment to purge
government programs of corrupt influences and to prevent improper dissipation of public
funds. Removal of persons whose participation in those programs is detrimental to public
purposes is remedial by definition."); Manocchio v. Sullivan, 768 F. Supp. 814, 817 (S.D.
Fla. 1991) ("Disqualifying a person from participating in a social program or practicing a
profession because of offensive activity is not punishment, if the past activity is such that the
public would have an interest in excluding the offender.").
167The loss of federal funds or debarment may not prevent researchers from continuing
to work in the same field. An additional shortcoming with NIH and FDA sanctions is that
they only cover trials that are regulated by the FDA or receive federal funds. O'Reilly,
supra note 5, at 335-36. Half of the trials currently conducted in the United States are
funded privately. Id. at 337. Legislation proposed in 1997 that would have called for the
regulation of all clinical trials affecting interstate commerce failed to pass. Id. at 351 n.219.
168See infra note 196.
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case provides a useful lens through which to examine the expressive
meaning of the failure to use criminal punishment.
Eighteen-year-old Jesse Gelsinger suffered from a mild form of a rare
metabolic disorder that affects the body's ability to break down ammonia.169
He was diagnosed at age two and for the remaining sixteen years of his life
170
successfully controlled his disease with a low-protein diet and drugs.
Jesse's treating physician told him about gene therapy trials conducted by
the Institute for Human Gene Therapy at the University of Pennsylvania
(IHGT).' 7' Dr. James Wilson, director of the IHGT, was the trial's sponsor,
which made him responsible for ensuring compliance with the 72regulations
governing human subject research, including informed consent.1
Jesse and his father met with researchers at the IHGT to determine
whether Jesse was an appropriate candidate for the study and to give
informed consent. 173 The researchers told the Gelsingers that the IHGT had
74
achieved a "certain efficacy" with respect to the treatment of the disease. 1
Due to the efficacy information and the informed consent document, Jesse
and his father believed that the risks of joining the study were minimal.175
Jesse enrolled in the trial in September of 1999. Four days later, he died.
After Jesse's death, the FDA conducted an investigation that revealed
that researchers had enrolled Jesse in the trial despite the fact that he did not
properly qualify to participate in it. 176 The FDA further determined that the
researchers "repeatedly or deliberately violated regulations governing the
169 Complaint 2, Gelsinger v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa., http://sskrplaw.com/links/
healthcare2.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2009).
170Id. 77 55-57.
171Gene therapies use specially created genetic material that is inserted into target cells

with the intent to cure a genetically-based disease. Baram, supra note 24, at 255. There are
currently approximately 500 gene therapy trials involving over 4000 human subjects with
funding from the NIH. Id. There are also some privately-financed studies approved by the
FDA. Id.
172 News Release, United States Attorney's Office, available at http://www.upenn.edu/
almanac/volumes/v5 l/n2 1/gts.html [hereinafter USAO News Release].
173Complaint, supra note 169, TT 59-60.
174 Id.
61. According to the plaintiffs complaint, defendant Dr. Arthur Caplan, an
ethical consultant to the research team, admitted after Jesse's death that "there was never any
chance that anybody would benefit from these experiments.
They [were] safety
studies ... . If you cured anybody, you'd publish it in a religious journal. It would be a
miracle. [But t]he researchers wouldn't say that." Id. 43-44.
'5 Id. 62.
176 Jesse's blood ammonia levels on the day before he received the gene transfer
exceeded the limit set out in the FDA protocol, but the researchers enrolled him anyway as a
substitute for another volunteer who had dropped out. FDA Suspends Trials at GeneTherapy Lab, CNN.coM, Jan. 22, 2000, availableat http://archives.cnn.com/2000/HEALTH/
0 1/22/gene.therapy/.
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proper conduct of clinical studies." 177 These violations included modifying
the FDA-approved informed consent document.
For example, the
researchers had removed information that monkeys injected with the virus
had become ill or died.178 Dr. Wilson and his research team had also
ignored an FDA request to revise the informed consent document so that
participants would be aware of serious side effects suffered by previous
subjects) 79 As a result, neither Jesse nor his father was aware of these
risks. According to Jesse's father:
Jesse and I were told ... that a prior patient, the patient before him, had shown a
clinical improvement of [fifty] percent in her ability to eliminate ammonia from her
system .... [After Jesse's death] I discovered that no efficacy was achieved at all in
this patient. I had no idea there was no success in gene therapy before my son's
participation in this. Nobody relayed that information to 18
me. I was under the
impression this worked .... I found out it was an experiment. 0

The FDA found numerous additional violations, including failures to
make required disclosures to the FDA, which may have brought the trial to
a stop before Jesse enrolled.181 Upon completing its investigation into
Jesse's death, the FDA commenced administrative proceedings to
disqualify Dr. Wilson from conducting further clinical studies.1 82 The

177

Letter from Steven A. Masiello, Dep't of Health & Human Serv., to James M.

Wilson, Inst. for Gene Therapy 1 (Nov. 30, 2000), available at http://www.fda.gov/foi/
nidpoe/nl2l.pdf [hereinafter Initiation Letter] (providing "Notice of Initiation of
Disqualification Proceeding")
178 WEYERS, supra note 121, at 605; Complaint, supra note 169,
61.
179 WEYERS, supra note 121, at 605 (citation omitted). Dr. Wilson failed to maintain
adequate case histories of subjects tested with the investigational drugs. Id.
180 Gene Therapy: Is There Oversightfor Patient Safety?: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Public Health of the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and Pension, 106th Cong 28,
31 (2000) [hereinafter Gene Therapy Hearing].
181 According to the Chief of the FDA's Center for Biologics, "We probably would have
made them stop the trial until we figured out what was going on." Id. Although the study's
approved protocol required termination of the trial "if a single subject develops Grade III or
higher toxicity," Dr. Wilson failed to terminate the study despite knowledge that five
subjects had exhibited Grade III toxicity. Initiation Letter, supra note 177, at 2-4. In fact, he
even failed to document toxicity levels for numerous subjects. Id. Dr. Wilson failed to
exclude people from the trial who did not meet the criteria for subject selection. Id. at 5-8.
A total of four ineligible people were entered into the study. Id. Dr. Wilson failed to
monitor all the subjects as required by the protocol, id., and he frequently submitted
misleading and inaccurate information to the independent overseeing body charged with
ensuring compliance with the approved protocol. He also did not report that two subjects
had suffered serious reactions. FDA Suspends Trials at Gene-Therapy Lab, supra note 176.
Furthermore, Dr. Wilson modified the trial's approved protocols without obtaining approval.
Initiation Letter, supra note 177, at 8-12.
182 See Initiation Letter, supra note 177, at 1.
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University of
Government eventually settled a civil suit with the
183

Pennsylvania for violations of the civil False Claims Act.
The settlement with the Government imposed a number of sanctions
upon Dr. Wilson that may, upon cursory inspection, appear to express
punishment. For five years, the settlement prohibits Dr. Wilson from
serving as a sponsor in any FDA clinical trial and from conducting human
subject research without the supervision of a monitor.1 84 Additionally, for
three years, the settlement prohibited him from conducting more than one
experiment at a time.' 85 It also required him "to lecture and author an
article on the lessons learned from this study [and] ...to advocate for
inclusion of any statements from those affected by the study, e.g., the
'1 86
Gelsinger family."
Closer scrutiny of these responses to his misconduct, however, leads to
The
the conclusion that they likely do not constitute punishment.
settlement does not permanently bar Dr. Wilson from serving as a trial
sponsor or from conducting human subject research. Rather, during the
period of restriction, the settlement not only allows him to serve in other
capacities, but also permits him to conduct research on humans as long as a
monitor is present. 87 The requirement of a monitor may bruise the ego of
someone of his stature. However, its insufficiency as punishment is
demonstrated if we imagine similar treatment of the more common
criminal. Imagine that a bank employee is guilty of embezzlement. Would
183USAO News Release, supra note 172 (announcing that the University of
Pennsylvania had agreed to pay $517,496). There was also an industry-wide response that
could arguably protect future victims. The FDA and NIH jointly announced a new initiative,
the Gene Therapy Clinical Trial Monitoring Plan, designed to increase the level of scrutiny
by adding reporting requirements for study sponsors, and a series of Gene Transfer Safety
Symposia designed to allow researchers to communicate with each other, share results about
unexpected problems, and ensure that everyone knows the rules. See Larry Thompson,
Human Gene Therapy: Harsh Lessons, High Hopes, FDA CONSUMER MAG., Sept.-Oct.
2000, available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2000/50O-gene.html. The FDA
launched random inspections in more than two dozen gene therapy trials nationwide and
instituted new reporting requirements. Id. Finally, President Clinton announced more "new
actions designed to ensure that individuals are adequately informed about the potential risks
and benefits of participating in research ...and steps designed to address the potential
financial conflicts of interest faced by researchers." Id. President Clinton also stated in May
2000 that he was sending a proposal for new legislation to Congress that would authorize
civil sanctions for researchers and institutions found to be in violation of regulations
governing clinical trials, which would give the FDA the power to fine researchers up to
$250,000 and their institutions up to $1 million. Id.
184USAO News Release, supra note 172.
185Id. Dr. Wilson is also required to have a special monitor when conducting animal
research that could influence the safety of human research participants. Id.
186Id. This Article does not deal with the other researchers involved.
187 Id.
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we believe that he was punished if, rather than facing criminal prosecution,
he was assigned a monitor to work with him for the next few years to
ensure that he does not attempt to embezzle more funds during that time
period? A limitation on research functions more as a deterrent, or as a way
to incapacitate, rather than as true punishment with its attendant message of
moral blameworthiness. 188 Finally, the settlement did not require Dr.
Wilson to admit to any wrongdoing or accept any blame for Jesse's death,
which makes the requirement that he lecture on the lessons learned from the
experience seem somewhat empty of expressive content. Unlike criminal
punishment, these responses to Dr. Wilson's misconduct do not carry the
collateral consequences of criminal punishment, and thus do not appear to
express the same condemnation and moral blame. Once the time period of
the FDA sanctions expires, Dr. Wilson is free to continue his work without
89

restriction. 1

Dr. Wilson has never apologized to the Gelsinger family.' 90 He still
conducts research' 9' and remains a tenured professor at the University of
Pennsylvania School of Medicine and chairman of its Molecular and
Cellular Engineering Department. 92 Furthermore, Dr. Wilson lost none of
his profits despite the fact that at the time of Jesse's death, he had financial
93
-interests in the study that may explain the motive behind his misconduct.
188 Nothing prevents Dr. Wilson from profiting from conducting human subject research,

even during the period of the restrictions. Arguably, in order to punish him for causing the
death of another, he should no longer be able to profit from his research, similar to the way
in which other offenders cannot profit by publishing a book about their crimes.
189 He did resign from his position as the head of the Institute for Human Gene Therapy,
but the Dean of the University of Pennsylvania Medical School made clear that his
resignation had "nothing to do with the Gelsinger case." Emily Sanders, Researcher Wilson
to Step Down as IHGT Head, DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN,
Apr.
23,
2002,
http://media.www.dailypennsylvanian.com/media/storage/paper882/news/2002/04/23/News/
Researcher.Wilson.To.Step.Down.As.Ihgt.Head-2157651 .shtml.
190 See Paul Gelsinger & Adil E. Shamoo, Eight Years After Jesse's Death, Are Human
Research Subjects Any Safer?, 38 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 25 (2008), available at
http://www.sskrplaw.com/publications/gelsinger-april-08.pdf ("The federal government
charged the researchers and their institutions with fraud. The defendants entered into
settlement agreements involving fines and other penalties.
But there was no
acknowledgment of responsibility, let alone wrongdoing, nor was there even a hint of
remorse in the form of an apology.").
191 See Univ. of Pa. Health Sys., Research/James Wilson, http://www.uphs.upenn.edu/
penngen/research/wilson.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2009) (describing Wilson's research).
192Sanders, supra note 189.
193 Dr. Wilson was the founder of a biotech company, Genovo, in which both he and the

University owned shares of stock. WEYERS, supra note 121, at 618. Contributions from
Genovo made up one-fifth of the $25 million annual budget of the Institute. Id. at 618-19
(citation omitted). In fact, the University's conflict-of-interest rules were altered to permit
Wilson to own 30% of the company's stock. See Diana L. Bush, Gene Therapy Trials: The
Role of the National Institutes of Health and Conflicts of Interest, 19 BIOTECH L. REP. 576,
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Although the Gelsinger family sued Dr. Wilson and the University, 9 4 the
case was settled, and only the University paid an undisclosed sum.' 95
Dr. Wilson was not prosecuted, although he could have been.' 96 The
use of alternative sanctions resulted in Dr. Wilson receiving better treatment
than similarly situated offenders; the failure to utilize criminal punishment
expresses that Dr. Wilson is entitled to different or special treatment from
the average offender because he is a well-respected and talented doctor
conducting socially beneficial research. While he may have suffered some
short-term humiliation, the state treated him very differently than it does

586 (2000). The University also gave Wilson the exclusive right to license patents derived
from the IHGT to Genovo and its corporate sponsors. See WEYERS, supra note 121, at 61819 (citation omitted). A year after Jesse's death, Targeted Genetics Corporation acquired
Marie McCullough, Human Guinea Pigs on the Frontiers of Medicine,
Genovo.
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, May 5, 2002, at DI, available at http://www.sskrplaw.coml
publications/5-20guinea.html. Dr. Wilson received $13.5 million in Targeted stock, and the
University received $1.4 million. Id. Researchers from other university hospitals who
failed to abide by the regulations also held equity interests in the companies sponsoring their
trials. Richard A. Knox, Physicians Deny Deaths Unreported, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 4,
1999, at Cl.
194 The Gelsinger family sued Dr. Wilson and other researchers and institutions involved
in the gene therapy trial for, among other things, wrongful death, intentional assault and
battery, fraud, lack of informed consent, and fraud on the FDA. See Complaint, supra note
169. The plaintiffs sought compensatory as well as punitive damages. Id.
195 The civil suit settled with the University paying an undisclosed amount to the
Gelsinger family. See Family Settles Suit over Patient's Death Following Gene Therapy
Clinical Trials, 15 Toxic L. REP. 1227 (2000).
196 For instance, Dr. Wilson's failure to abide by the mandatory regulations governing
the conduct of human subject experiments and thereby causing the death of Jesse Gelsinger
is comparable to routinely prosecuted homicides. A person is guilty of murder when "it is
committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life." MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.2(l)(b) (1962). A person acts
recklessly when he "consciously disregards a substantial and. unjustifiable risk" that his acts
will cause a particular result. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02(2)(c). Here,
Dr. Wilson consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death would
result from his failure to comply with the regulations. The regulations are mandatory and
consist of reporting requirements that are meant to ensure the rights and safety of human
subjects. 21 C.F.R. § 50.1 (2008) ("Compliance... is intended to protect the rights and
safety of subjects involved in investigations .... "). The reporting of adverse events, for
example, is required so that an independent body can continuously determine whether, at any
point, the risks to an individual's welfare outweigh the benefits of the research. 21 C.F.R.
§§ 56.108, 56.109, 56.11 l(a)(2) (2008). Dr. Wilson's "repeated and deliberate" failure to
report adverse events prevented the independent review body from performing its functions
and ending the trial, as the FDA indicated it likely would have done. See supra note 189.
Hence, his failure to abide by the mandatory reporting requirements created a substantial risk
that a human life would be put at risk of death. The risk he took was unjustifiable because
there was no justification for his failure to abide by the mandatory reporting requirements.
Id. The mail fraud and wire fraud statutes could also provide sources of liability. See 18
U.S.C. § 1343 (2006) (wire fraud); id. § 1341 (mail fraud).
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197
other offenders who have caused the death of another individual.
The criminal brand has symbolic, practical, and expressive
significance that other sanctions do not. It is rife with notions of censure
and blameworthiness,1 98 and justifies the imposition of punishment, which
includes not only the potential loss of liberty, but also a host of collateral
consequences. The use of any sanction short of criminal punishment risks
causing expressive harm because the message is that what was done to the
victim does not deserve criminal punishment and its collateral
words, it is acceptable for this offender to treat this
consequences. In other
1 99
victim in this manner.

IV. THE UTILITY OF DESERT2 °.

Criminal punishment expresses moral condemnation in a way that
alternative sanctions do not. This Part argues that imposing criminal
punishment will also further instrumentalist goals, such as deterrence 20 1 and
moral education, as a "happy consequence. 20 2 How criminal punishment
can serve these additional goals of punishment in the human
experimentation context is discussed next.
A. DETERRENCE
Punishment can deter by vindicating the value of the victim through
203
fnto
This protective function works by issuing a "sting" that the
protection.

197 In fact, according to their attorney, the Gelsinger family is "surprised and
disappointed at the seeming lack of any consequence to Wilson for the misdeeds that led to
the death of Jesse Gelsinger." Sanders, supra note 189 (statement of Alan Milstein,
Attorney for Jesse Gelsinger).
198Harry V. Ball & Lawrence M. Friedman, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the
Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REv. 197, 216
(1965).
199 FEINBERG, supra note 100, at 102-03.
200 The title of this Part is borrowed from Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The

Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV.453 (1997).
201 MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 116, at 140 (explaining that the "retributivist's
notion of desert is derived from punishment's role as a deterrent but is quite different from
deterrence").
202 MICHAEL

S.

MOORE,

THE

MORAL

WORTH

OF

RETRIBUTION,

CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY

RESPONSIBILITY,

179-82 (Ferdinand

Schoeman ed., 1987); see MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 116, at 129-30 & n.26
(distinguishing the retributive motive, which is to annul the appearance of superiority of the
wrongdoer, from other non-retributive motives, such as deterrence and moral education).
This is not to say that deterrence is not an appropriate part of any just punishment scheme,
but it is not the goal of retribution. Hampton, supra note 120, at 1659 & n.2.
203 MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 116, at 138.
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offender feels upon engaging in a prohibited act.2 °4 The desire to avoid this
pain in the future is how deterrence is achieved. 0 5
Determining how best to deter misconduct in human subject research
is important because the protection of human subject autonomy essentially
falls upon the individual researcher. In theory, institutional bodies such as
the FDA, NIH, and Institutional Review Boards (IRB) 20 6 police misconduct

by approving research protocols and conducting periodic audits. In
practice, resource constraints make any consistent effort to ensure that
human subjects are protected illusory.20 7 Since these institutions cannot
audit even a small subset of human subject research, they rely upon
researchers to provide truthful information in the study protocol when
seeking approval to conduct research, to comply with follow-up reporting

204

Id. at 140.

205 Id.
206

The role of the Institutional Review Board (IRB) is to review and approve research

protocols and informed consent documents, ensuring that the safety of individuals will be
adequately protected and that the benefits outweigh the risks. O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 331
& n.93 (citing OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 23, at 3. Some companies have their
own IRBs, and other IRBs operate independently, being hired by contract to study any
management organization or researcher who wants their services. O'Reilly, supra note 5, at
100. Their composition and duties are set forth by statute. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 56.101, 56.103,
56.109 (2008) (FDA); 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.103, 46.109 (2008) (NIH). Members usually consist
of lay volunteers and members from the researcher's institution. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R.
§ 56.107 (FDA).
207 See also Gelsinger & Shamoo, supra note 190, at 25-27 ("Last year, a report by the
inspector general of the Department of Health and Human Services found that the FDA, the
agency responsible for overseeing most clinical trials, inspected just 1 percent of study sites.
Small wonder, since it has a mere two hundred investigators and there are 350,000 sites."
(citing OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., No. OEI-01-0600160, THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION'S OVERSIGHT OF CLINICAL TRIALS (2007);
THE BALT. CONFERENCE ON ETHICS, ETHICS IN NEUROBIOLOGICAL RESEARCH WITH HUMAN
SUBJECTS (Adil E. Shamoo ed., 1997)). IRBs are often overwhelmed with the amount of

work they are required to do, and they are typically under-resourced. See Jonathan Moreno
et al., Updating Protectionsfor Human Subjects Involved in Research, 280 J. AM. MED.
ASS'N 1951, 1956 (1998); see also O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 336-37 & n.131 (noting that
IRBs are overworked and underfunded (citing 1 NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N,
RESEARCH INVOLVING
PERSONS
WITH MENTAL DISORDERS
THAT MAY AFFECT
DECISIONMAKING CAPACITY 71 (1998))). The shortcomings of IRBs are frequently studied

and discussed. See, e.g., O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 330 n.91. As one commentator
recognized, "[I]t is now widely accepted that IRBs are overwhelmed by trial oversight
responsibilities and documentation, are easily misled or ignored by researchers, and are
unwilling to challenge institutional colleagues." Baram, supra note 24, at 267-68; see also
Kus v. Sherman Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 1214, 1216-17 (I11.App. Ct. 1995) (involving a
researcher that changed the informed consent form from the one that had been approved by
the FDA by removing language that the intraocular lens was experimental. The defense
expert testified that if the IRB had audited the researcher's charts, it would have discovered
the discrepancy).
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2 °8
Thus, the
requirements, and to follow informed consent requirements.
subject
human
of
oversight
institutional
and
reliable
consistent
lack of
20 9
research fails to provide adequate deterrence incentives.
Researchers are essentially left to police themselves, and historically,
they have failed in their efforts. It took a law student to bring an end to the
FDA to stop Dr. Kligman's
Tuskegee syphilis experiments, 2 1° the suspicions
of a patient and his
experiments at Holmesburg Prison, the

208Although the FDA and the NIH do perform periodic inspections and audits, and IRBs

have obligations to continue monitoring the research protocol subsequent to approval, all
three bodies simply cannot monitor every human subject trial conducted. Site visits and
audits are conducted by investigators for the FDA and NIH. O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 332;
see U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., Office for Human Research Protections,
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2009) (NIH procedures); U.S. Dep't of Health
& Human Serv., U.S. Food and Drug Administration Home Page, http://www.fda.gov (last
visited Feb. 2, 2009) (FDA procedures). Very few trials are audited. O'Reilly, supra note 5,
at 345. The FDA simply does not have the resources to meet its workload. Id. at 346 n. 183
(citing Frances 0. Kelsey, The Bioresearch Monitoring Program,46 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J.
59, 60-61 (1991)). In fact, the FDA's supervision of trials is a "discretionary function"
depending on government priorities. O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 346 (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(a) (1994)). The NIH also requires each institution to maintain its own audit system
and to report problems in patient protection to the NIH. 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(b)(5) (2008).
IRBs frequently fail to continue review of approved studies. See O'Reilly, supra note 5, at
332 (citing NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 207, at 71).

209 See O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 333 ("The repercussions of embarrassment and cost
would be a real deterrent if enforcement occurred more frequently and was more efficient
than the slow process now in place.").
210 The Tuskegee syphilis study was the longest experiment involving human subjects in
United States history, running for forty years from 1932 until 1972. Katz, supra note 24, at
230. During the now infamous study, researchers deliberately deceived 400 AfricanAmerican men with syphilis, leaving the disease untreated in order to study the natural
course of the disease. Id. Some men were not told that they had syphilis and were told that
they were receiving routine medical treatment, while others were told that they were
receiving treatment for the disease. Id. The experiments continued even after the
government put regulations in place to protect human subjects and after an effective
treatment for syphilis had been discovered. WASHINGTON, supra note 93, at 165-66.
Articles detailing the experiments had been published in medical journals, and the results
from the study had been shared at a 1936 American Medical Association meeting. Id. at 166;
WEYERS, supra note 121, at 498-99. But it took a law student to put an end to it. WEYERS,
supra note 121, at 582. When he learned of the experiments, he complained to public health
service officials. Id. at 500. But the blue ribbon panel it assembled in response concluded
that the unwitting subjects should continue to remain untreated. Id. Frustrated, he told a
friend at the Associated Press, and on June 26, 1972, an article appeared in the New York
Times. Id. at 502. As a result of public outrage, the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare terminated the study shortly thereafter. Id. By then, only seventy-four of the
original 400 test subjects were still alive. Id. Many doctors expressed the view that there
had been nothing wrong with the study. Id. at 608. Some doctors argued that they had done
nothing wrong because African-Americans suffering from syphilis would not have
voluntarily sought treatment anyway. WASHINGTON, supra note 93, at 161. None of the
individuals involved were ever criminally prosecuted.
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lawyer to discover Dr. Golde's mining of Moore's body, and a death to
expose the actions of Dr. Wilson. These are only a few instances of
ineffective self-policing.2 11 Another example is the recent discovery that
for over sixty years, researchers at the State University of Iowa (now Iowa
University) concealed experiments performed on unwitting orphans. A
professor at the University led experiments on children to test his
hypothesis that stuttering was conditioned in children as the result of overly
critical parents.212 With the University's knowledge and agreement, he
tested his hypothesis at an orphanage, telling the orphanage that he was
conducting a study to improve children's speech.21 3 During the course of
the experiment, his research assistant very successfully made non-stuttering
children into stutterers.21 4 After the experiment was over, very little effort
was made to correct the stuttering they had induced in the children,215 and
the efforts they did make were largely unsuccessful.216
Those involved in the study acknowledged that they were engaged in a
"'monster experiment' that would, if discovered, be compared to the World
War II experiments and ruin the careers of the scientists and researchers
involved."2 17 Thus, they decided to conceal it. The experiment was
discovered in 2001 only after the
research assistant suffered an attack of
2 18
conscience and alerted the press.

211

Concerned with the lack of compliance, after Jesse Gelsinger's death, the NIH

reminded other gene therapy researchers of their reporting obligations. Bush, supra note
193, at 576. Researchers responded with 691 adverse events that had not been disclosed as
required. Id. The FDA and NIH investigations of other gene therapy trials confirmed that
many human subjects had suffered from "adverse effects," many of which had not been
reported by the researchers or organizations involved. Id. For example, medical researchers
at Cornell University and Tufts University failed to report six deaths to NIH. See Deborah
Nelson & Rick Weiss, Earlier Gene Test Deaths Not Reported: NIH Was Unaware of
'Adverse Events,' WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2000, at A1; Deborah Nelson & Rick Weiss, Gene
Therapy DeathsDisclosed,BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 3, 1999, at A10. Although some, if not all,
of the deaths were the result of the subjects' underlying illnesses, researchers were still
required to report the deaths to the oversight agencies. Nelson & Weiss, Gene Therapy
Deaths Disclosed, supra. The FDA "suspended gene therapy trials at St. Elizabeth's
Medical Center in Boston, a major teaching affiliate of Tufts University School of
Medicine .... because scientists there failed to follow protocols and may have contributed to
at least one patient death." Thompson, supranote 183.
212 See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 839 n. 32 (Md. 2001).
213

Id.

214

See id.

215

Id.

216

Id.
id.

217

218 Id.
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The threat of criminal punishment would likely have important
deterrent effects on researchers.21 9 Currently, a researcher engaged in
calculated risk-taking knows that if he violates human subject protections,
the likelihood of discovery is minimal and even if discovered, he will not be
prosecuted. At most, he may pay compensatory damages 220 or face
temporary restrictions on his research. 221 The "sting" of criminal
punishment, including the stigma of being branded a criminal, risk of
imprisonment, and message of disapproval, denunciation, and reproach, is
more serious than that provided by alternative sanctions. The fear of being
labeled a criminal will likely be felt strongly by researchers because they
are a class that is prone to view themselves as different from the common
criminal. 222 Hence, the consequences of criminal punishment can be
expected to deter more effectively than other sanctions even if the
possibility that culpable acts will be discovered remains equally small.223
219

John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the

Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 193 (1991)
(arguing that criminal punishment operates "as a system of moral education and
socializing"); Hampton, supra note 113, at 17 ("The use of punishment may be particularly
desirable if a person or legal institution wants to take advantage of the deterrent value of
retributive suffering.").
220 The tort system has often proved inadequate to protect human subjects. Issues such
as whether a researcher owes a duty of care to the subject remain an open question. See
Alvino, supra note 24, at 910-12. Furthermore, subjects must demonstrate cognizable injury
prior to recovery, and actual physical injury may not result from a violation of informed
consent. Although most jurisdictions allow recovery without physical injury for negligent
infliction of emotional distress, id. at 913 n.140, "damages ...may be difficult to prove in
" Saver, supra note 20, at 226, cited in Alvino, supra note
the absence of physical harm ....
24, at 913 n.140.
221 See supra notes 186-212 and accompanying text (discussing the sanctions faced by
Dr. Wilson as a result of his role in Jesse Gelsinger's death). In fact, even when misconduct
is demonstrated, fellow researchers tend to rally around the accused. See supra note 183 and
accompanying text (discussing the response of researchers to Dr. Kligman and Dr. Wilson).
222 See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 356 (1968) ("People
who value their standing in the community are likely to be especially sensitive to the stigma
associated with a criminal conviction."); Ball & Friedman, supra note 198, at 216-17
("Business abhor the idea of being branded a criminal ....[B]usinessmen, after all, form a
large, respectable, and influential class in our society."); Arthur L. Liman, The Paper Label
Sentences: Critiques, 86 YALE L.J. 630, 630-31 (1977) ("To the businessman, . . . prison is
the inferno, and conventional risk-reward analysis breaks down when the risk is jail.").
223 See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, Crime, Clutchability, and Individuated Treatment, in DOING
AND DESERVING, supra note 100, at 252, 263 (claiming that punishment is appropriate for
rational risk-takers); Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to
Achieve CriminalLaw Objectives: Understandingand Transcending the Criminal-CivilLaw
Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1355 (1991) ("[T]he theory is that humans, as rational
weighers of the risks and benefits of their actions, will risk being penalized if the worst they
face is having to pay market value for their illicit gains."); Steven Shavell, CriminalLaw and
the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1237-
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B. MORAL EDUCATION
Punishment can also be an effective moral educator.22 4 The infliction
of pain serves an educative function because it "interferes with the
offender's pursuit of his interests, draws his attention to the crime and
society's condemnation of it, and conveys to him that certain actions are
'fenced off in virtue of what we take to be their immoral character.' ''225 The
criminal law's educative and socializing role is arguably necessary to teach
researchers that violations of autonomy and dignity are wrong despite the
potential utility of the research.
There is evidence that research community norms may serve to
facilitate misconduct. First, researchers have been resistant to attempts to
place mandatory limits on their research. For example, many researchers
objected to the binding nature of the Nuremberg Code as an appropriate
guide for their behavior. The Code was created in response to the atrocities
committed by Nazi doctors during the Second World War and forms the
basis for the protection of human subjects in the United States today. 226 It
establishes a set of mandatory, explicit, and uniform ethical guidelines and
standards to govern the conduct of medical research on humans. 227 Its ten
principles seek to attain two broad goals. First, it aspires to protect
autonomy by giving human subjects the absolute right to decide whether to
participate in experiments and to end their participation at any time. 228
Second, it aims to protect the welfare of human subjects either by
prohibiting certain risky research from being conducted at all or by

38 (1985) ("Nonmonetary sanctions may be helpful of course because their threatened use
might deter parties who could not be deterred by monetary sanctions alone.").
224 Some philosophers do not believe that moral education is a legitimate goal of
punishment. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, in THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra

note 144, at 295.
225 Hampton, supra note 113, at 21.

226The Code forms the basis for the protection of human subjects in the United States
today. Michael A. Grodin, Historical Origins of the Nuremberg Code, in THE NAZI
DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 24, at 139. In the 1950s, the NIH adopted

guidelines providing that "[tlhe rigid safeguards observed at NIH are based on the so-called
'ten commandments' of human medical research which were adopted at the Nuremberg War
Crime trials after the atrocities performed by Nazi doctors had been exposed." Leonard H.
Glantz, Influence of the Nuremberg Code on U.S. Statutes, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE

NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 24, at 185. An integral feature of the laws governing human
subject research is the protection of the autonomy and dignity of human subjects. See 45
C.F.R. §§ 46.101-46.409 (2008).
227 Grodin, supra note 226, at 121;

WASHINGTON,

supra note 93, at 258.

228 See Office of Human Subjects Research, Nat'l Insts. of Health, Directives for Human
Experimentation: Nuremberg

Code,

provisions

/nuremberg.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2009).

1, 9,

http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines
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requiring researchers to terminate an experiment at any229stage if its

continuation is "likely to result in injury, disability, or death.,
Researchers rejected the Code as "a good code for barbarians but an
unnecessary code for ordinary physicians., 230 They thought that the Code's
"legalistic" demands were unnecessary and unduly burdensome to
research.231 As a former Dean of the Harvard Medical School put it:
[T]he Nuremberg Code was conceived in reference to Nazi atrocities and was
written for the specific purpose of preventing brutal excesses from being committed or
excused in the name of science. The code, however admirable in its intent, and
however suitable for the purpose for which it was conceived, is in our opinion not
necessarily
pertinent to or adequate for the conduct of medical research in the United
232
States.

Second, the research community appears to resist efforts to effectively
investigate allegations of misconduct. For example, after Dr. Kligman's
actions at Holmesburg Prison came to light, attempts were made by the
American Academy of Dermatology to discover more information about his
research at the prison. The Academy created a task force that sent letters to
the researchers involved in the experiments asking for comments. The
letters referenced the atrocities at Nuremberg. When Academy officers
learned of this, they were furious.233 They not only immediately informed
the task force that it had not been authorized "to suggest that [the]
experiments may have been in violation of the Nuremberg Code, ' 234 but
229 Glantz, supra note 226, at 184 (referring to provisions 2-8 and 10 of the Nuremberg
Code); Grodin, supra note 226, at 121.
230 Katz, supra note 24, at 228.
231 A Harvard researcher, Henry Beecher, described the Code as "a rigid act of legalistic
demands ... a legalistic document .... Until recently the Western world was threatened

with the imposition of the Nuremberg Code as Western credo." See George J. Annas, The
Nuremberg Code in U.S. Courts: Ethics Versus Expediency, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE
NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 24, at 201, 201-05. This researcher rejected rigid rules,
stating in 1959 that "the problems of human experimentation do not lend themselves to a
series of rigid rules. In most cases, these are more likely to do more harm than good."
WEYERS, supra note 121, at 377 (citing H.K. Beecher, Experimentation on Human Beings,
169 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 461-78 (1959)).
232 WEYERS, supra note 121, at 401. Courts have not utilized the Code as a basis for
liability. But see Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 834 (Md. 2001). Courts
have cited the Nuremberg Code with approval. See, e.g., United States. v. Stanley, 483 U.S.
669, 686 (1987) (O'Conner, J., dissenting); id. at 686-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Heinrich
ex rel. Heinrich v. Sweet, 62 F. Supp. 2d 282, 321 (D. Mass. 1999); White v. Paulsen, 997 F.
Supp. 1380, 1383-84 (E.D. Wash. 1998) Hoover v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Serv.,
984 F. Supp. 978, 978 (S.D. W. Va. 1997), affd, 129 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 1997); In re
Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 821-22 (S.D. Ohio 1995); Whitlock v. Duke
Univ., 637 F. Supp. 1463, 1470-71 (M.D.N.C. 1986), aff'd, 829 F.2d 1340 (4th Cir. 1987).
233 WEYERS, supra note 121, at 612.
234 Id. (citation omitted).
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they also immediately sent apologies to each researcher who had received
the letter.
Finally, the research community tends to defend culpable researchers
and downplay the harm. For instance, with respect to Dr. Wilson and the
death of Jesse Gelsinger, some members of his community stated that the
sanctions against him were unwarranted. When the University of
Pennsylvania restricted Dr. Wilson's ability to conduct experiments on
humans 235 and decided to stop manufacturing genetically-altered viruses, a
leading scientist in the field said that the University's move was an
overreaction. "This is throwing the baby out with the bath water ....236
It
basically eliminates the gene therapy program if you can't run trials.,
Another prominent and well-respected professor, ethicist, and director of
the gene therapy program at the University of California, San Diego stated
237
that Jesse's death was "[a]t worst,... another pothole in the road.,
Comments such as these underscore that research norms are in need of
modification-a need that can be well addressed by criminal sanctions. The
criminal sanction can shape or even change norms or preferences within a
community because people in part learn what is morally blameworthy
through what is punished.238 The sanction teaches people, both potential
offenders and the community at large, what the public morality is, whether
or not they fully internalize it. 239 Criminal punishment can be used selfconsciously "to change beliefs, attitudes, and personal values and goals
[and] can effectuate policy considerations by influencing what a person
240
thinks he ought to do or what he wants to do in a particular situation.,
Some scholars even argue that the criminal category is not about public
235 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Institute Restricted After Gene Therapy Death, N.Y. TIMES,

May 25, 2000, at A20. He was required to restrict his work to the study of molecules and
cells, and to experiment only on animals. Id.
236 Id.
237

See Stephen S.Hall, A Death in Philadelphia, MIT TECH. REv., Jan. 2000, at 2,

available at http://www.technologyreview.com/biomedicine/12015/pagel/ (statement of
Theodore Friedmann, Director, Program in Human Gene Therapy, University of California).
238 See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a
Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DuKE L.J. 1, 24 (noting that the criminal sanction is a
particularly powerful tool to shape the preferences of the individual defendant and of society
at large).
239 Ball & Friedman, supra note 198, at 217, 222; Coffee, supra note 219, at 223.
240 Ball & Friedman, supra note 198, at 220. "Often law tries to redefine roles." Cass R.
Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 923 (1996). "For
example, the law has said that husbands may not rape their wives ....All of these measures
can be seen as attempts to create new or better norms to define the relevant roles." Id.; id. at
913 ("A good deal of governmental action is self-consciously designed to change norms,
meanings, or roles, and in that way to increase the individual benefits or decrease the
individual costs associated with certain acts."); Ball & Friedman, supra note 198, at 220.
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. a set of techniques to be manipulated for

24 1

Changing social norms can, in turn, "influence
social ends.,
choices.., by altering the effects of reputational incentives and
consequences for self-conception. '' 242 If the criminal sanction is successful
in shaping social norms, then behaving in a manner inconsistent with them
will result in "public disapproval," which in turn will produce
"embarrassment or perhaps shame and a desire to hide. 243
To the extent that idealization bias and social benefit bias affects
public views about researcher misconduct, 2

4

criminal punishment can help

245
"rekindle in the public a sense of the immorality of the defendant's acts.,
Its power to express moral condemnation may more effectively deter
misconduct and change both researchers' and society's views concerning
bad acts. Criminal punishment can help overcome the idealization bias and
social benefit biases that currently appear to exist in the context of human
subject experimentation.

V. SCRUTINIZING CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT

I have argued that criminal punishment may be the only sanction that
can punish culpable medical actors engaged in intentional misconduct that
violates individual rights to autonomy, dignity, and self-determination. I
have considered this question in the context of bad acts involving the lack
of consent. I end by considering some preliminary questions and concerns
that use of the criminal sanction may raise, although I do not intend to
resolve them here.246

Punishment raises the specter of over-deterrence. With regard to the
forms of misconduct discussed in this Article, there exists little difficulty in
distinguishing bad acts from good ones. However, if use of criminal
punishment will be extended to police other forms of research misconduct,
this question of over-deterrence will require further scrutiny. If mistaken or
negligent acts cannot be consistently and accurately distinguished from
wrongful ones before imposing punishment, the fear of erroneous
241Ball & Friedman, supra note 198, at 211; see also Mann, supra note 104, at 1807

(acknowledging that punishment can be viewed as a means of social control).
242 Sunstein, supra note 240, at 916. Cass Sunstein defines norms as "social attitudes of

approval or disapproval, specifying what ought to be done and what ought not to be done."
Id. at 914.
243 Id. at 915.
244 See Burrows, supra note 92.
245 Ball & Friedman, supra note 198, at 222; see also id. at 217 (explaining that criminal

punishment can make "the proscribed conduct illegitimate in the eyes of a potential actor,
even when the actor disagrees with the purpose of the law").
246 These will be discussed in future Articles.
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identification as a culpable actor may keep well-intentioned actors from
engaging in research.247 Additionally, if the line between good and bad acts
in medical research is a fine one, researchers may become excessively
cautious in order to avoid wrongful exposure to criminal punishment. The
argument against criminal punishment, then, is that when there exists
difficulty distinguishing between acts we want to encourage and those 2we
48
do not, it is more appropriate to price rather than to prohibit the behavior.
Another concern with criminal punishment is that vigorous
enforcement and stringent penalties may make it difficult to discover
unlawful acts in human subject research. Recent work in the area of system
justification theory posits that these responses may cause system justifying
behaviors-behaviors amongst actors in the system that inhibit detection
and prevention efforts.2 49 Empirical research into the culture and practices
of the research community will be necessary before any prediction can be
made about the effect punishment will have on researcher motivations.
However, if criminal punishment will result in increased difficulty in
ferreting out research crime, this is an important question to consider.
If criminal punishment is deserved in appropriate circumstances, then
serious thought must be given to the amount of punishment necessary to
humble the wrongdoers. If researchers are prosecuted under existing
criminal statutes, do the sentencing schemes map well with what the
appropriate sentence should be? In some cases, the punishment provided
by existing criminal statutes may be too severe, and in others, too lenient.
If new crimes or sentencing schemes are appropriate, then there are
institutional problems to consider. The existence of idealization bias and
social benefit bias creates a chicken-and-egg problem. The biases may
result in the failure to impose punishment, but imposing punishment may be
necessary to change the existing biases. Punishment can reduce the efficacy
of these biases, but the existence of them may make prosecutors unwilling
to proceed with criminal prosecutions. Additionally, the biases may also
affect legislators' willingness to pass criminal legislation or sentencing
schemes to punish researchers, especially because one can expect
significant resistance from the medical profession to criminal sanctions
247See generally Craig S. Lemer & Moin A. Yahya, "Left Behind" After Sarbanes-

Oxley, 44 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 1383, 1384 (2007) (arguing that "soaring penalties for corporate
crimes and dilution of a mens rea requirement.., could have the paradoxical consequences
of creating more corporate crime" as people with high moral standards choose to leave the
field).

248 Cooter, supra note 149, at 1524 ("If lawmakers can identify socially desirable
behavior, but are prone to error in assessing the cost of deviations from it, then sanctions are
preferable to prices.").
249 Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research: Implications
for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice,94 CAL. L. REv. 1119, 1160 (2006).
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directed specifically at them. 250 How do we address this? Perhaps the first
step is to at least recognize the problem.
VI. CONCLUSION

The fact that human subject research is socially beneficial should not
mean that culpable acts go unpunished, Criminal punishment in appropriate
instances would send a clear, expressive message that doctors are not
privileged to treat human subjects in a manner inconsistent with their
inherent value
as human beings.
Punishment can reassert
acknowledgement of the victim's worth in the face of a denial. Proper
punishment will cause suffering in the offender and demonstrate to
researchers that their actions are worthy of stigma, ridicule, and shame, and
in this way, perhaps change the attitudes of the relevant community. This,
in turn, will restore the proper balance between protecting human dignity
and autonomy, and allowing socially beneficial research to continue. It will
also likely make the self-policing nature of the existing regulations more
effective. Punishment will help change the existing biases, which can in
turn change the existing norms and place the protection of individuals front
and center instead of allowing individuals to be used as guinea pigs in favor
of broader societal goals. If we are serious about protecting individual
autonomy and dignity in research, consideration of criminal punishment is
an important step.

250 For example, in 2002, two representatives introduced the Human Research Subject
Protection Act of 2002 which would increase protections for human subjects. H.R. 4697,

107th Cong. (2002), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dI 07:h.r.04697:.

As of 2005, however, the bill has not come up for a vote. Id. Sherman, Silverstein, Kohl,
Rose & Podolsky, Chronology, http://www.sskrplaw.com/articles/pdf/biochron6.pdf (last

visited Feb. 2, 2009). Similarly, Senator Kennedy's bill, the Research Revitalization Act of
2002, which would also increase human subject protections, has not yet come up for a vote.
S. 3060,

107th

z?d107:s.03060.

Cong.

(2002),

available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
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